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Abstract
This dissertation studies a few models in two categories of operations management. The
first part of the dissertation focuses on supply chain management related topics. We
consider a supply chain model with one supplier and one retailer who acts as a newsven-
dor. The first model in this dissertation focuses on the supplier and the retailer’s optimal
policies in a multi-period newsvendor model. We derive the optimal pricing and order-
ing policies for demand with Increasing Generalized Failure Rate (IGFR) property and
obtain comparative statics for the optimal prices. We discover that under certain con-
ditions of the demand distribution, the supplier’s optimal prices are increasing in time.
Moreover, the price increments are increasing in the backorder cost and the optimal
prices are increasing in the backorder cost as well. We also perform a distribution-
free analysis of the multi-period newsvendor model and provide the structure of the
worst-case distribution.
In addition to the pricing and ordering decisions, we also analyze the risk-return
trade-off in single-period newsvendor models using the mean-variance approach. We
discuss the classic newsvendor model which uses the wholesale-price contract and two
variations of the model, a spot market model and a revenue-sharing contract model. We
derive the risk-return curve for the retailer and the corresponding distribution in closed-
form for a two-point distribution and a three-point distribution in the classic model.
When the demand follows a multi-point distribution or a continuous distribution, we
provide a linear program to compute the risk-return curves and show the curves’ upper
bounds. An approximation algorithm is introduced to efficiently calculate the risk-
return curve in the continuous distribution models.
Introducing some variation to the basic model, we consider a supply chain setting
with a spot market where unsatisfied demand can purchase from the supplier at the
market price. The supplier’s decisions are the wholesale price and the buffer inventory
for the spot market. We derive the supplier’s optimal decisions and study the supplier’s
v
risk-return trade-off under uniform and exponential distributions. Another problem that
we consider is the risk-return analysis under a revenue-sharing model. We derive the
supplier’s optimal pricing policy and characterize the effect of φ on both the supplier and
the retailer’s decisions and risks. Numerical experiments are conducted to demonstrate
the results.
The second part of this thesis concerns resource allocation in an online setting,
specifically, the online matching problems. Online matching problems are used as the
backstage algorithm by search engines to match advertisements with each search. We
focus on the online matching problem with concave return functions and a random per-
mutation model. In this dissertation, we introduce two online learning algorithms to
solve the associated matching problem. The main idea is to utilize the observed data
in the allocation process and project it into the future. We begin with the one-time
learning algorithm that only uses the data to compute an allocation rule once. This
algorithm achieves near-optimal performance when input data satisfy certain condi-
tions. To further improve the performance, we introduce a dynamic learning algorithm
which updates the allocation rule at a geometric pace, at time εn, 2εn, 4εn and so on.
This algorithm achieves near-optimal performance with fewer restrictions on the input
data conditions. We compare the performance of the one-time learning algorithm, the
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This dissertation consists of two parts. The first half of the dissertation focuses on sup-
ply chain management related problems. Supply chain refers to a network of resources
and organizations that moves goods or services from the suppliers to the end customer.
A supply chain is a very complex and dynamic system which involves material flow,
information flow and financial flow. The Council of Supply Chain Management Profes-
sionals (CSCMP) defines supply chain management as “the planning and management
of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics man-
agement activities, plus coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which
can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers”. Supply
chain management is a crucial part of a business’s success and customer satisfaction.
There are countless examples of companies that went out of business because of poor
management of the supply chain. Thus, supply chain management has drawn much
attention from researchers and scholars in the past few decades and there are still chal-
lenges left unsolved.
Pricing and ordering are integral parts of supply chain management. In some sense,
the goal of supply chain management is to match supply with demand. This is done
with the help of proper pricing strategy, correct ordering decision, and efficient inventory
management. For any company to stay competitive and financially stable, reducing
operational costs (such as purchasing cost, inventory cost, transportation cost) and risk
1
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(such as stockout risk, defective products, delivery failure) at the same time increasing
profit is the never-ending pursuit. Thus, it is crucial to find a suitable pricing and
ordering strategy based on the company’s supply chain characteristics, and this is the
focus of Chapter 2 of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, we consider a two-echelon supply chain model with one supplier and
one retailer who acts as a newsvendor. The newsvendor model is one of the most classical
models in inventory management. The newsvendor model’s order quantity is based on
the tradeoff between the overage cost and the shortage cost. One common underlying
assumption of the newsvendor model is a fixed purchase price. In practice, however,
suppliers also try to maximize their revenue. The model proposed in this dissertation
looks at a setting where the supplier of a multi-period newsvendor strategically sets the
prices to maximize its revenue. In this setting, the supplier knows the newsvendor’s
ordering strategy and cost parameters, and actively proposes a set of prices for all
periods, then the newsvendor makes the ordering decision accordingly. In our model,
the pricing and ordering decisions for all periods must be made before the start of
the selling horizon. The newsvendor’s inventory can be carried to the next period if
there is overage, and demand can be backlogged if there is shortage. There are several
applications of such a model. One example is in the fresh produce retail industry. In
the fresh produce retail industry, due to the long lead time of production, the order
quantity and prices must be planned ahead of the growing season. Moreover, fresh
produce has short shelf lives and high holding cost, making it necessary to have small
portion deliveries throughout the selling season.
Chapter 2 focuses on the optimal pricing policy of the supplier and the optimal
ordering policy of the retailer in such a multi-period supply chain model. We first show
the existence of an optimal pricing policy, then propose a procedure for computing
the optimal prices. We show that the optimal prices are decreasing in time under
our model and explain the intuition behind our result. We also adopt the approach
used in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) to obtain comparative statics for the optimal
prices. For the supplier’s profit function, our analysis shows that it is unimodal when
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the demand distributions have increasing generalized failure rate. For the supplier’s
optimal prices, we discover that under certain conditions of the demand distribution,
the price increments are increasing. Moreover, the price increments are increasing in
the backorder cost. Therefore, the optimal price is increasing in the backorder cost.
Numerical experiments confirm the monotonicity results of the supplier’s optimal prices
and the revenue functions of the supplier and the retailer.
In most of the studies of the newsvendor models, demand information are assumed
as public information. However, in the real world, it is not possible to obtain the actual
demand distribution function. In view of that, people are interested in the characteristics
of the worst-case distribution function and the corresponding robust ordering policy.
For example, Scarf (1958) proposed a single-period newsvendor model under worst-
case distribution where only the mean µ and variance σ2 are known. Gallego and Moon
(1993) later provided a simplified proof to that result and extended the distribution-free
model to other cases. In Section 2.5, we extend the model in Scarf (1958) to a multi-
period newsvendor model. In particular, we present a distribution-free analysis of the
multi-period newsvendor model and provide the structure of the worst-case distribution.
In addition to pricing and ordering decisions, another important aspect in supply
chain management is the profit vs. risk relationship between different players, particu-
larly, the way that the supply chain’s profit and risk are split between the supplier and
the retailer. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we perform a risk-return analysis for a
single-period supply chain model. The concept of risk and return analysis is to study
the trade-off between the expected revenue and the potential variability in the revenue.
The approach adopted for this analysis in Chapter 3 is the mean-variance approach.
We discuss the classic newsvendor model which uses the wholesale-price contract and
two variations of the model, a spot market model and a revenue-sharing model. In the
classic newsvendor model, the retailer pays the supplier according to the wholesale-price
contract. The supplier receives a fixed payment; thus, does not face any uncertainty in
revenue. Given this, the focus of the risk analysis for the classic model is the retailer’s
problem. We first look at the retailer’s minimum risk given an expected return. Under
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our model setting, the only available demand information is the mean and number of
points in the distribution. By fixing different values of the expected profit, we are able to
find the risk-return curve (efficient frontier) for the retailer. Moreover, we can compute
the exact distribution function that achieves the optimal risk-return curve when the
demand distribution is a two-point distribution and a three-point distribution. When
the demand follows a multi-point distribution, we provide a linear program to compute
the risk-return curve. We show the upper bound of the retailer’s risk-return curve and
the smallest point in the optimal distribution. We then generalize this analysis to the
continuous case in Section 3.2.4. We model the problem using an infinite program and
propose an approximation algorithm to efficiently calculate the risk-return curve. At
the end of this section, numerical results of a continuous distribution risk-return curve
solved using the approximation algorithm are demonstrated. After analyzing the sup-
ply chain’s profit variation, we look at how the supply chain’s profit is split between
the supplier and the retailer. In particular, we derive lower bounds of the supplier’s
portion of the total supply chain’s profit. We show that this lower bound is tight by
providing distributions that could achieve the lower bound. The lower bound shows
that the supplier is always guaranteed to receive a certain portion of the supply chain
profit regardless of the demand distribution.
In Section 3.4, we consider a supply chain structure with a spot market. The retailer
who is a newsvendor purchases from the supplier based on the wholesale price given.
The retailer sells the inventory to the end customer. When the retailer’s order quantity
cannot meet all the demand, the unsatisfied demand will turn to the spot market to
purchase the item. The supplier can build up buffer inventory to sell on the spot
market at the market price. Therefore, the supplier’s decisions are the price and buffer
inventory for the spot market. In this section, we investigate the supplier’s optimal
decisions. In the spot market, the supplier is directly facing the random demand. So,
we analyze the supplier’s risk-return trade-off in this case. Furthermore, numerical
examples with a uniform distribution and an exponential distribution demonstrate the
risk-return curves.
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Section 3.5 focuses on a different setup. We adopt a revenue-sharing contract in-
stead of the wholesale-price contract, see Cachon and Lariviere (2005). Specifically,
the retailer pays the supplier a wholesale price upon purchase of the inventory, plus a
percentage (1 − φ) of the revenue received in the selling period. The shared revenue
includes sales revenue and salvage value of the unsold items. We study the supplier
and the retailer’s optimal decisions and risk-return trade-offs. We also characterize the
effect of φ on the optimal decisions, profit expectation, and variance functions. Section
3.5.1 shows the supplier and the retailer’s optimal decisions and risk-return functions
in closed-form for uniform and exponential distributions.
The second part of this thesis concerns resource allocation in an online setting.
Specifically, we consider an important class of online resource allocation problem — the
online matching problems, and propose efficient algorithms for this class of problems.
The online matching problem usually considers a bipartite matching. In a bipartite
matching, there is a bipartite graph. We need to find a matching between the two
sides in graph G such that no edges in the matching have common endpoints. When
all the vertices in both sides are given upfront, we call this problem an offline problem.
In the online matching problems, there is a bipartite graph with a part of the vertices
known and a part of vertices arriving one at a time. When a vertex arrives, it needs
to be matched to an available vertex from the other side. The objective is to maximize
the size of the matching, see Karp et al. (1990) and Mehta (2012). Online matching
problems are widely used in practice because they are the backstage algorithm used by
search engines (e.g., Google and Bing) to match advertisements with each search. In
that setting (known as the Adwords problem), there are m advertisers (which we also
call the bidders). A sequence of n keywords are searched during a fixed time horizon.
Based on the relevance of the keyword, the ith bidder would bid a certain amount bij
to show his advertisement on the result page of the jth keyword. The search engine’s
decision is to allocate each keyword to one of the m bidders. Note that each allocation
decision can only depend on the information earlier in the arrival sequence but not on
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any future data.
In Chapter 4, we study the online matching problem with concave return functions.
Most prior research uses linear or piece-wise linear return functions. However, as pointed
out in Devanur and Jain (2012), there are several practical motivations for considering a
concave function of the matched bids. Among them are convex penalty costs for under-
delivery in search engine-advertiser contracts, the concavity of the click-through rate in
the number of allocated bids observed in empirical data and fairness considerations. In
each of these situations mentioned above, the objective can be expressed as a concave
function.
In Chapter 4, we introduce two online learning algorithms to discern the demand
and solve the associated Adwords problem. The main idea is to utilize the observed
data in the allocation process. When the input data arrives, the search engine could use
the past data and project it into the future. Section 4.2 focuses on a one-time learning
algorithm that only uses the data to compute an optimal allocation rule once. By se-
lecting the first εn amount of data as our learning sample and projecting the demand
arriving pattern into the future, this algorithm achieves near-optimal performance when
input data satisfy certain conditions. In Section 4.3, we introduce a dynamic learning
algorithm which achieves near-optimal performance with less restrictions on the input
data conditions. In the dynamic learning algorithm, the allocation rule is updated at a
geometric pace, at time εn, 2εn, 4εn, . . . and so on. This choice of the updating points
balances the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. Thus, the dynamic learn-
ing algorithm makes better use of the input data without slowing the allocation process
down too much. We compare the performance of the one-time learning algorithm, the
dynamic learning algorithm, and the greedy algorithm in numerical experiments in the
last part of Chapter 4.
Finally, we note that the materials in the dissertation have resulted in two published
papers. More specifically, part of Chapter 2 is from the paper Optimal Pricing for Selling
to a Static Multi-Period Newsvendor Chen et al. (2017) and the majority of Chapter 4
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is from the paper A Dynamic Learning Algorithm for Online Matching Problems with
Concave Returns Chen and Wang (2015).
Chapter 2
Optimal Pricing in a
Multi-Period Newsvendor Model
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review
The newsvendor model is probably the most classical model in inventory and supply
chain management. In a newsvendor model, a retailer decides the order quantity of
a product when facing uncertain demand, trading off the possibility of overstocking
with understocking. There have been extensive studies on newsvendor models in the
literature. For some recent reviews, we refer the readers to Khouja (1999) and Qin et al.
(2011).
In practice, the newsvendor (retailer) is often supplied by a supplier who has pricing
power over the product. The traditional newsvendor model assumes that the purchase
price of the product is fixed. However, the supplier may utilize its pricing power to
decide a price that maximizes his profit. Such a model is first studied in Lariviere and
Porteus (2001), in which the authors consider a supplier who sells to a newsvendor
and derives the optimal price for the supplier. In this chapter, we extend the model in
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) to a multi-period setting. We consider a supplier who sells
a product to a multi-period newsvendor. Inventory holding cost and backorder cost are
8
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incurred if there are excess or a shortage of inventory at the end of each period. The
supplier posts a price for each period in the beginning of the time horizon, and the
retailer must commit to an ordering quantity for each period before the selling horizon
starts.
There are many practical situations where such a multi-period model is relevant.
One example is in the fresh produce industry. One major characteristic of the fresh
produce industry is the long lead time of the production due to the growing cycle of the
produce. Therefore, the retailer’s order quantities must be planned ahead of the growing
season despite demand uncertainty so that the supplier can deliver the desired quantity
during the selling season. Moreover, due to the short shelf lives of fresh produce and the
high holding costs, it is not possible to have all products delivered at once and stored
during the selling season. Indeed, it is common practice in the fresh produce industry
for the retailers to commit to a sequence of ordering quantities before the selling season
starts. According to i2, a supply chain results company, Dole Asia (a division of Dole
Food Company) plans the plant according to the customer’s demand Bossers (2007);
and Tesco, the UK’s largest retailer, signs three- to five-year contract with its fresh
produce suppliers, allowing them to plan further ahead Knowles (2016). In addition,
the supplier sometimes has the pricing power over the product due to the scarcity of
supply (e.g., see Richards et al. (2011)). In such situations, the problem for the supplier
is one that sells to a multi-period newsvendor as described in our model.
In this chapter, we solve the problem of optimal pricing for selling to a multi-period
newsvendor. Particularly, we provide a simple solution procedure for the optimal prices
as well as a closed-form solution to the optimal ordering quantities under the optimal
prices. We find that the optimal prices are decreasing in time under our model. We
also adopt the analysis in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) to obtain comparative statics
for the optimal prices.
In the remainder of this section, we review how this model relate to and differ
from the literature. First of all, this model is related to the inventory theory. Various
inventory models have been studied and many results have been obtained, see, e.g.,
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Nahmias (2011), Porteus (2002) and Snyder and Shen (2011). However, instead of the
typical continuous review or periodic review models, we consider a case where all the
inventory decisions must be made at the beginning (which is equivalent to having a lead
time that is longer than the planning horizon). Therefore, our decision model invokes
only one shot of inventory decisions for the retailer rather than decisions that depend
on the state of the system.
This work is also related to the revenue management literature (see Talluri and van
Ryzin (2004) for a comprehensive review). In revenue management, the seller decides
the optimal prices for its products to maximize the revenue, which is the case for the
supplier in our model. However, in our model, the demand function (i.e., the purchase
quantity of the retailer) is resulting from solving a multi-period newsvendor model.
Therefore, our problem is a very specific form of pricing problem.
There has also been a wealth of literature of supply chain contracts in which the
supplier and retailer sign a contract in terms of cost-sharing, buy-back, etc, to coordinate
the supply chain and to increase the overall efficiency Cachon (2003), Lariviere (1999),
Tsay (1999). Although a coordinated supply chain performs better in many aspects, in
practice, an uncoordinated supply chain is still widespread due to its simple structure.
Our work will be focused on uncoordinated supply chains.
Finally, as we mentioned in the introduction, one application of this model is in the
fresh produce industry. There has been much work that is related to the fresh produce
supply chain. We refer the readers to Ahumada and Villalobos (2009) for a thorough
review. However, in most of those studies, the supply chain is modeled by a dynamic
system in which the lead time is relatively short compared to the selling season. For
example, Chao et al. (2018, 2015), Zhang et al. (2016) propose approximation algorithms
for perishable inventory systems under different settings. However, those assumptions
may not be realistic in practice because of the long growing cycle of the produce and
the limited spot market Maruyama and Hirogaki (2007). In contrast, we consider the
case where the supplier and the retailer only make a one-time decision about the price
and the order quantity ahead of the selling season.
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2.2 Model
In this section, we first state the model assumptions and event setups. Then, the
mathematical model in the retailer’s problem and the supplier’s problem are presented.
2.2.1 Model Assumptions
We consider a supplier who provides the supply of a certain product to a retailer over a
horizon of T periods. Before the start of the time horizon, the supplier decides the selling
price in all time periods pt, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . After observing the supplier’s prices, the
retailer decides the order quantities Qt for each period. In each period t, the retailer
faces a random demand Dt with Ft(·) being the cumulative distribution function. We
do not assume that the demands in each period are independent. The retailer incurs a
per unit holding cost h to carry inventory from one period to the next, and a per unit
backorder cost b for each unit of unsatisfied demand. In addition, the selling price of
the retailer is r. In our model, we assume the holding cost, the backorder cost, and the
selling price are constant throughout the entire horizon. However, our model can be
easily extended to the case where they differ across different periods.
In our model, before the start of the first period, the supplier decides a sequence
of prices p = {pt}Tt=1. Then the retailer decides Q = {Qt}Tt=1 based on p. The initial
inventory of the retailer is I0 = 0. Then, in each period t, the following sequence of
events take place.
1. The retailer receives order quantity Qt and pays the supplier ptQt.
2. Demand Dt realizes, and the inventory at the end of period t is It = It−1+Qt−Dt.
3. If t ≤ T − 1, then the profit in period t is Rt = rDt − hI+t − bI
−
t , where I
+
t =
max{It, 0} represents the positive part of It, and I−t = max{−It, 0} represents the
negative part of It. In the last period T , the profit is RT = rmin{DT , IT−1 +
QT } − hI+T − bI
−
T .
Here, we can view the backorder cost as the per period loss of goodwill cost when the
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seller is unable to satisfy the demand (regardless of whether the demand can be satisfied
eventually). The total profit of the retailer is R(Q) =
∑T
t=1 (Rt − ptQt), and the total




Having observed the supplier’s prices pt, the retailer decides how many units to purchase
in each period before demand arrives. The retailer’s problem can be modeled as follows:
















s.t. I0 = 0, It = It−1 +Qt −Dt, ∀t = 1, . . . , T
Qt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T.
(2.1)
Here, the first part of the objective function is the expected revenue, and the second



































s.t. I0 = 0, It = It−1 +Qt −Dt, ∀t = 1, . . . , T
Qt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T.
Then, using the inventory dynamics It =
∑t
i=1(Qi − Di) to replace the It’s in the
objective function, we can rewrite the cost minimization problem as


















s.t. Qt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T.
(2.2)
In this chapter, we assume that Di follows a continuous distribution with support
on [0,+∞). Therefore, C(Q) is a strictly convex function in (Q1, . . . , QT ) on Qi ≥ 0.
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Thus, for any given p, there is a unique optimal solution Q(p) for the retailer. In the
following, we use Q∗(p) to denote the optimal purchasing strategy of the retailer under
price p.
2.2.3 Supplier’s Problem
In our model, we assume the supplier knows the retailer’s ordering strategy and cost
parameters. The supplier’s problem is to find the optimal pricing policy to maximize the







s.t. pt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T.
(2.3)
Having stated the model assumptions and formulations, we focus on the supplier
and the retailer’s decisions and revenues in the next section.
2.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the model and provide a procedure to solve for the optimal
pricing policy. In addition, we show some properties of the optimal pricing policy. Then,
there will be numerical results to demonstrate the revenue improvement from using the
proposed pricing policy in Section 2.4.
2.3.1 Optimal Policy
To begin with, we study the optimal policy of the supplier and the retailer. We define
the following notation. Let F̃t(·) denote the CDF of the cumulative demand up to time
t, i.e.,
∑t
i=1Di. We have the following theorem.






T for t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and pT = p∗T , where ∆∗t




h+b ), and p
∗





p = (p1, . . . , pT ) is an optimal pricing policy, and it satisfies p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pT with
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Proof. First, we prove that there exists an optimal p such that Q∗(p) has values given






























≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T (2.5)
∂C
∂Qt
(Q∗) · Q∗t (p) = 0, Q∗t (p) ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, . . . , T (2.6)
Let p be an optimal solution to problem (2.3), and Q∗(p) be the corresponding
optimal solution to (2.2) under p. Thus, p and Q∗(p) satisfy the KKT conditions (2.5)
to (2.6). If ∂C(Q∗)/∂Qt = 0 holds for all t, then solving the KKT conditions yields























We observe that Q∗(p) satisfies condition (2.5) with C̄ replacing C. Here, we use C̄ to
denote the retailer’s cost function in (2.2) where pt’s are replaced by p̄t’s. Thus, Q
∗(p)
is also an optimal solution under price p̄.
In addition, the supplier’s revenues under the two prices are the same, i.e., S(p̄) =
S(p). This is because p̄t 6= pt only when Qt(p) = 0. Therefore, we can conclude that
there exists a p such that Q∗(p) satisfies (2.4).
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This objective function can be regarded as a function of variables (pt − pt+1)’s and pT .





h+b ) term separately, and thus we have the result for p. Moreover, since
all the demands are positive, F̃−1t (
b−pt+pt+1
h+b )’s must be positive as well. To maximize
each term, we need pt−pt+1 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pT . Furthermore,
if b > 0, then there exists pt− pt+1 such that (pt− pt+1)F̃−1t (
b−pt+pt+1
h+b ) > 0. Therefore,
the optimal solution must satisfy that pt > pt+1. 
Theorem 1 indicates that the supplier should set the prices in the starting period the
highest, and decrease the prices as time proceeds. Now we provide some explanation for
this result. Intuitively, in our model, lowering the price in early periods will simply shift
demand from later periods to early periods without increasing the total order quantity.
This is because the retailer can expect leftovers from the excessive orderings in the
early periods and reduce the ordering quantities in later periods. Meanwhile, lowering
the prices in later periods could attract more demand in total, because it will shift the
critical ordering point in the last period. Thus, lowering the prices in later periods is
more appealing than lowering price in early periods for the supplier.
To further see this mathematically, we consider a two-period model and argue that
the optimal prices must satisfy p∗1 ≥ p∗2. If p∗1 < p∗2, then by increasing p∗1 to p∗2, the order
quantity in the first period will decrease while the order quantity in the second period
will increase. Meanwhile, a key observation is that the total order quantity only depends
on p∗2 according to the optimality condition (2.4). Thus, the total order quantity stays
the same during the process. As a result, more units will be sold at the higher price p∗2




2 cannot be optimal. This argument
can be applied similarly to the multi-period model and show iteratively that p∗t ≥ p∗t+1
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
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2.3.2 Unimodality of Supplier’s Profit Function




















Let Q̃t = F̃
−1
t ((b − ∆t)/(h + b)) and Q̃T = F̃
−1
T ((b− pT + r)/(h+ b+ r)). Then,
each term in (2.8) can be rewritten as Wt(Q̃t) = Q̃t[b−(h+b)F̃t(Q̃t)] for t = 1, . . . , T−1,
and WT (Q̃T ) = Q̃T [b + r − (h + b + r)F̃T (Q̃T )]. In the following, we give conditions
for this problem to be unimodal and thus it has a unique optimal solution. We shall
use the notion of increasing generalized failure rate, which is defined by Lariviere and
Porteus (2001) as below.
Definition 1 (Increasing Generalized Failure Rate). A distribution with cumulative
distribution function F and density function f is said to have increasing generalized
failure rate (IGFR) if g(x) = xf(x)/(1− F (x)) is weakly increasing for all x such that
F (x) < 1.
Now we are ready to state the theorem for the unimodality of Wt(Q̃t).
Theorem 2. Suppose F̃t(·) is IGFR. Then Wt(Q̃t) is unimodal on [0,∞).
Proof. In the proof, we show the case for t < T . The case for t = T can be proved in a
similar way. The first order derivative of Wt(Q̃t) is W
′
t(Q̃t) = b− (h+ b)F̃t(Q̃t)− (h+
b)Q̃tf̃t(Q̃t). Setting W
′

























which is also increasing in Q̃t on F̃t(Q̃t) < b/(b + h) (it is obvious that W
′
t(Q̃t) = 0
does not have a solution on F̃t(Q̃t) ≥ b/(b+ h)). Hence, the left-hand side of equation
(2.9) is increasing in Q̃t. Therefore, there exists at most one solution to the first order
condition of Wt(Q̃t). Thus, Wt(Q̃t) is unimodal on [0,+∞). 
Recall that F̃t(·) is the CDF of the cumulative demand up to time t. By Banciu and
Mirchandani (2013), many classes of distributions would make F̃t(·) satisfy the IGFR
property (e.g., when Dt’s are i.i.d. normal distributions, standard uniform distributions
or exponential distributions). Therefore, the condition in Theorem 2 is mild.
2.3.3 Determinants of Supplier’s Price
In this section, we analyze how the demand distributions and cost parameters affect
supplier’s optimal prices. We first define some notation. Let F̄t, F̂t denote the cumula-
tive distribution function up to period t for two sequences of demands D̄ and D̂, and




t denote the optimal prices that
maximize supplier’s profit under demand D̄ and D̂ respectively. Define ∆̄∗t = p̄
∗
t − p̄∗t+1
and ∆̂∗t = p̂
∗
t − p̂∗t+1. We have the following theorem:







in ξ for all ξ on [0,+∞), then ∆̄∗t ≤ ∆̂∗t .
In Lariviere and Porteus (2001), the authors called that F̄t is greater than F̂t in the
star order (symbolically, F̄t ≥∗ F̂t) if N(ξ) is increasing in ξ. Therefore, Theorem 3
shows that if the cumulative demand function at time t increases in the star order, then
∆∗t = p
∗
t − p∗t+1 decreases. Particularly, if all other parameters stay the same, then the
prices in periods 1 to t will be higher while the rest of the prices stay the same.
Proof. Let Q̄∗t and Q̂
∗
t denote the optimal total order quantity up to time t under
demand D̄ and D̂, respectively. From Theorem 1, we have ∆̄∗t = b − (h + b)F̄t(Q̄∗t )
and ∆̂∗t = b − (h + b)F̂t(Q̂∗t ). In the following, we show that F̄t(Q̄∗t ) ≥ F̂t(Q̂∗t ). By the
optimality condition of Q̄∗t and Q̂
∗
t , we have
b−(h+b)F̄t(Q̄∗t )−(h+b)Q̄∗t f̄t(Q̄∗t ) = W̄ ′t(Q̄∗t ) = 0 = Ŵ ′t(Q̂∗t ) = b−(h+b)F̂t(Q̂∗t )−(h+b)Q̂∗t f̂t(Q̂∗t ),
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t ) = F̂t(Q̂
∗





Let ᾱ∗ = F̄t(Q̄
∗
t ) and α̂
∗ = F̂t(Q̂
∗
t ). The above equation can be written as









Note that when N(ξ) is increasing, we have
















Let α = F̂t(ξ), or ξ = F̂
−1










Using α̂∗ to replace α in inequality (2.11), then combine it with equation (2.10), we
have


















Now, we claim that H(x) = x+ F̄−1t (x)f̄t(F̄
−1
t (x)) is increasing in x when x is between
α̂∗ and ᾱ∗. Consider 1−H(x), we have













The first term is decreasing in x, and we will show that the second term is positive





1−x is the generalized failure rate of F̄t at F̄
−1
t (x), which is
increasing in x by the IGFR assumption. To see that it is positive, we first note that
by the optimality condition W̄ ′t(Q̄
∗










































And because of the optimality condition Ŵ ′t(Q̂
∗
































at both ᾱ∗ and α̂∗. As proved earlier, it is decreasing in x; thus, it must be positive
between ᾱ∗ and α̂∗. Therefore, 1−H(x) is decreasing in x and H(x) is increasing in x
on the interval between ᾱ∗ and α̂∗. Thus, combining (2.12), we conclude that ᾱ∗ ≥ α̂∗,
which is equivalent to F̄t(Q̄
∗
t ) ≥ F̂t(Q̂∗t ). The rest of the theorem follows. 
Next, we study the effect of the backorder cost on the optimal prices. We have the
following theorem:




T , resp.) is increasing in b.
Proof. By Theorem 2, if F̃t is IGFR, then Wt(Q̃t) is unimodal in Q̃t. Since Q̃t is






























If b increases, then
b−∆∗t
h+b increases. Since F̃t is IGFR, the first term in (2.13) increases
in b. Thus, the optimal ∆t must also increase (because the derivative at ∆
∗
t is greater
than 0). Thus, ∆∗t is increasing in b.
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By the same arguments, p∗T increases in b. Thus, the theorem holds. 
Corollary 1. If F̃t is IGFR for all t, then p
∗
t is increasing in b for all t.
Next, we study a property of the optimal prices under some conditions on the dis-
tribution. In Theorem 1, we already showed that the optimal prices are decreasing in
t. In the following, we study the relationship between the price differences.
Theorem 5. Suppose F̃t and F̃t+1 are IGFR. If F̃t+1 ≤∗ F̃t, then ∆∗t+1 ≥ ∆∗t .





























Thus, by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4, we have ∆∗t+1 ≥ ∆∗t . 
Corollary 2. If F̃t is IGFR for all t and F̃t’s are ranked in reverse star order, i.e.,
F̃t ≥∗ F̃t+1 for all t, then ∆∗t+1 ≥ ∆∗t for all t.
2.3.4 Constant Pricing Model
In this subsection, we study a special case of the multi-period model. We are interested
in the retailer’s ordering behavior when the supplier’s prices are constant. Suppose the
retailer faces i.i.d. demand in each period. The price offered by the supplier is the same
through the entire horizon. The retailer still incurs holding costs or backorder costs for
excessive inventory or shortage. Before stating the next theorem, we define a property
for demand distributions.
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Definition 2 (Convex Sum Property). A distribution X has convex sum property at η
if the following inequalities hold at η
2F−11 (η) < F
−1
2 (η) and 2F
−1




t+1(η), ∀t ≥ 2. (2.14)
where F−1t (·) is the inverse CDF of the sum of t i.i.d. X. We say a distribution has
concave sum property if −X has convex sum property.
We have the following results for normal distribution.
Lemma 1. Normal distribution has convex sum property at η for all η ∈ [0, 0.5], and
concave sum property for all η ∈ [0.5, 1].
Proof. Let X ∼ N(µ, σ2). Then, F−1t (·) is the inverse CDF of N(tµ, tσ2), i.e.,




where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. If η ∈ [0, 0.5], then we have
2F−11 (η) = 2µ+ 2Φ
−1(η)σ < 2µ+
√
2Φ−1(η)σ = F−12 (η),
and





t− 1Φ−1(η)σ + (t− 1)µ+
√
t+ 1Φ−1(η)σ + (t+ 1)µ
= F−1t+1(η) + F
−1
t−1(η).
Thus, normal distribution has convex sum property for η ∈ [0, 0.5]. By symmetry,
normal distribution has concave sum property for η ∈ [0.5, 1]. 
Now we are ready to state the theorem.
Theorem 6. Suppose the demand distributions have concave sum property at bb+h .
Under constant pricing, the retailer’s optimal order quantities are decreasing in t, ∀t =
1, . . . , T − 1, i.e.
Q∗1 > Q
∗
2 > · · · > Q∗T−1.
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Similarly, suppose the demand distributions have convex sum property at bb+h . Un-
der constant pricing, the retailer’s optimal order quantities are increasing in t, ∀t =
1, . . . , T − 1, i.e.
Q∗1 < Q
∗
2 < · · · < Q∗T−1.





















Now we will show Q∗1 > Q
∗








Therefore, we have showed Q∗1 > Q
∗
2.











which is equivalent to Q∗t > Q
∗
t+1, for 2 < t < T − 2. Therefore, the first part of the
theorem is proved. The proof for the second part is very similar to that of the first part
with inequality signs in the opposite direction. 
Theorem 6 suggests that under constant pricing, the optimal order quantities are
decreasing if the demand distribution has concave sum property at certain points. This
result is somewhat surprising at first because if the demand distribution and prices
are identical in each period, it is natural to think that the order quantities should be
the same throughout the horizon. However, when the distribution has concave sum
property, the cumulated demand becomes less variable as time proceeds. For a fixed
critical ratio, the newsvendor should order more aggressively in the earlier period, while
more conservative in the later periods. The excessive inventory from the earlier periods
can be used as a buffer for the uncertain demand. When the holding cost is very high,
carrying inventory becomes costly. To maximize the expected profit for the items, the
retailer should order less in the early periods to avoid holding costs. In an extreme case,
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when the backorder cost is zero, the retailer should backorder all the demand in the
first T − 1 periods and wait until the last period to satisfy all the demand.
The proof gives another interesting result. From (2.15) we can see that when pa-
rameters h, b are fixed, retailer’s order quantities Qt,∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1 does not depend
on p. So the supplier’s price only affects the last period’s order quantity. This is due to
the exogenous demand. As long as the demand distribution stays the same, the optimal
order quantity should not be affected by price p. Intuitively, retailer’s problem is to
balance the overage cost and shortage cost in each period. When h and b are fixed,
increasing p only increases the overage cost in the last period, so the retailer would
prefer to order less in the final period.
When the demand at the retailer’s end is normally distributed with mean µ, and
standard deviation σ, the following result will hold.
Corollary 3. When the demand in each period is normally distributed, then under
constant pricing, if b > h, then the retailer’s optimal order quantities are decreasing in
t, ∀t = 1, . . . , T , i.e. Q∗1 > Q∗2 > · · · > Q∗T−1 > µ; if b < h, then the retailer’s optimal
order quantities are increasing in t, ∀t = 1, . . . , T , i.e. Q∗1 < Q∗2 < · · · < Q∗T−1 < µ.
In addition, if
√
TΦ−1( b+r−ph+b+r ) >
√
T − 1Φ−1( bh+b), then we have Q
∗
T > µ. Other-
wise, Q∗T < µ.
Proof. We will show the proof of case 1 where b > h. To get the proof for case 2, one
can just change the inequality signs in the proof of case 1. It is shown in Lemma 1 that
normal distribution has convex sum property on η ∈ [0.5, 1]. Thus, Theorem 6 applies




)σT−1 + µT−1 − Φ−1(
b
h+ b
)σT−2 − µT−2 > µ.
Since b > h, η = b/(h + b) ∈ [0.5, 1]. Rearranging terms, we will see this holds for all
T ≥ 2.
Lastly, we will show the conditions for Q∗T . From (2.15) we have,
Q∗T = σTΦ
−1( b+r−ph+b+r )− σT−1Φ




TΦ−1( b+r−ph+b+r ) >
√
T − 1Φ−1( bh+b), then Q
∗
T > µ. Otherwise, Q
∗
T < µ. 
When b > h, it is more beneficial for the retailer to overstock than understock.
To avoid understock, the retailer should place larger orders in the earlier period and
gradually increase the order quantity over time. Note that inventory from the earlier
periods has more opportunities to be sold, so we also take into consideration the number
of selling periods ahead when computing the order quantity. Consider an extreme case
where h = 0 and b is very large. In this case, the retailer incurs no holding cost for
inventory. It is obvious that the optimal solution is to place a large order for the entire
planning horizon in the first period and deplete the inventory gradually.
When b < h, it is more beneficial for the retailer to understock than overstock. To
avoid overstock, retailer should place smaller orders in the earlier period and gradually
increase the order quantities as demand realizes overtime. An extreme case is when
b = 0 and h is very large. In this case, the retailer incurs no backorder cost for not
satisfying demand. The optimal strategy in this case is to wait for the last period to
place order for all the backordered demand.
In the final period, unsatisfied demand remains unsatisfied but incurs backorder
costs. The leftover inventory has no value and incurs extra disposal costs equal to h.
When the backorder cost and expected sales is low, the understock cost is low. As a
result, the retailer tends to be conservative when ordering, resulting in a order quan-
tity smaller than the mean. When the backorder cost and expected sales is high, the
understock cost is high. The retailer tends to order more to reduce the probability of
stockout. Thus, the order quantity is greater than the mean.
2.4 Numerical Experiment
In this section, we conduct some numerical experiments to illustrate our results. We
consider a five-period model in our experiment and set h = 1, b = 1, r = 20, and
Fi(·) ∼ Γ(0.5, 30) as the base problem. According to Banciu and Mirchandani (2013),
Gamma distributions are IGFR. Also, by Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) and van
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Zwet (1964), Gamma distributions X and Y with the same scale parameter and shape
parameters θ and γ, respectively, satisfy that if θ ≤ γ, then X ≥∗ Y . Therefore, the
test problems satisfy the conditions in Theorems 4 and 5.
In the numerical experiments, we calculate the optimal price curves as we vary b or
h while keeping the other parameters as in the base problem. The results are shown in
Figures 2.1 and 2.2. From Figure 2.1, we can see that the optimal prices are decreasing
in time as Theorem 1 suggests, and as b increases, the price path lies higher on the plot,
which is consistent with Theorem 4. Similarly, in Figure 2.2, we see that the prices are
decreasing in time in all cases, and as h increases, the price path lies higher on the plot.
Also, both figures show that as t increases, the differences between consecutive prices
are increasing, i.e., pt − pt−1 ≤ pt+1 − pt, which is consistent with Theorem 5.
Period



















Figure 2.1: Price path for various b with h = 1
In the next two figures, we keep the parameters fixed as the base problem and change
h or b to see the effect of the parameter on the supplier’s and retailer’s revenue. Figure
2.3 and 2.4 shows the plot of supplier’s and retailer’s revenue for various b and h. The
plot on the left shows that as b increases, the retailer’s revenue decreases, but is always
positive. The supplier’s revenue is increasing in b. Figure 2.4 shows that both supplier’s
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Figure 2.2: Price path for various h with b = 1
and retailer’s revenue is decreasing in h for h > 0.
Next, we compare the case when the supplier uses the optimal pricing policy versus
a constant pricing policy. Particularly, we still choose h = 1, b = 1, r = 20, and
Fi(·) ∼ Γ(0.5, 30) to be the base problem, and vary parameter b or h in the experiment.
Under each parameter, we compute the optimal revenue by using the optimal pricing
policy and the best constant pricing policy, and study the gap between them. The best
constant pricing policy is computed by enumerating a range of prices and computing
the corresponding Q∗t using the KKT conditions (2.5) to (2.6) and choosing the one that
achieves the highest revenue. The price that gives the largest p(
∑T
t=1Qt) is the optimal
constant price. The results are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In the tables, we use R∗
to denote the revenue under optimal prices, R∗c to denote the revenue under optimal
constant prices, and p∗c to denote the optimal constant price. The percentage revenue
differences (1−R∗c/R∗)×100% are shown in the parentheses next to the constant pricing
revenue.
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Figure 2.3: Supplier and retailer’s revenue for various b
b 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
R∗ 636.08 663.12 698.26 736.94 777.61
R∗c 636.08 (0.00%) 652.54 (1.60%) 669.00 (4.19%) 694.10 (5.81%) 723.01 (7.02%)
p∗c 11.52 11.81 12.09 13.24 13.78
Table 2.1: Revenue difference between optimal pricing policy and constant pricing policy
for various b
From Tables 2.1 and 2.2, we can see that using the optimal pricing policy could lead
to significant revenue improvement over the best constant pricing policy. Particularly,
the difference is larger when b is large, while the difference is relatively stable in h.
2.5 Distribution-Free Multi-Period Newsvendor Model
The model in the previous section requires a known demand distribution. However, in
most cases, the distribution information is very limited. Sometimes, only the mean and
variance are accessible. In this section, we study the optimal ordering problem in a multi-
period newsvendor model under a worst-case demand distribution. In particular, we
derive a second-order cone programming (SOCP) formulation to calculate the optimal
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Figure 2.4: Supplier and retailer’s revenue for various h
h 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
R∗ 751.81 718.37 698.26 682.47 668.92
R∗c 744.89 (0.92%) 689.90 (3.96%) 669.00 (4.19%) 658.10 (3.57%) 647.77 (3.16%)
p∗c 13.11 12.56 12.09 12.17 12.25
Table 2.2: Revenue difference between optimal pricing policy and constant pricing policy
for various h
ordering quantity under this model and obtain some characteristics for the worst-case
distribution.
Before we proceed, we briefly review the related literature about this problem. In
Scarf (1958), Scarf addressed the single-period newsvendor problem with demand infor-
mation of only the mean and variance. Later, Gallego and Moon (1993) reviewed his
contribution and extended the results to other modified newsvendor models. We state
the Scarf’s Rule for the single-period newsvendor model from Scarf (1958).
Proposition 1. (Scarf’s Rule) Given b + r > p, in the distribution-free model, the
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There exists a two-point distribution that gives Qs as the optimal order quantity.
This distribution-free model can be extended to multi-period problem with a total
of T periods. Let x = (x1, . . . , xT ) be the random variable for demand in each period.
Suppose the demands are unknown except that the marginal mean and variance in
period t are µt and σt, respectively. In the following, we denote this set of distributions



























Let F (x) be the CDF of the joint distribution of the demands for period 1 to T .
Then, given Qis, the worst-case distribution can be computed via the following problem,




RT Ct(Q,x)dF (x) + (h+ b+ r)
∫
RT CT (Q,x)dF (x)
s.t.
∫
RT xtdF (x) = µt, ∀t = 1, . . . , T∫
RT x
2




t , ∀t = 1, . . . , T∫
RT dF (x) = 1,
dF (x) ≥ 0,
(2.18)





















t zt) + λ ≥ (h+ b)
∑T−1
t=1 Ct(Q,x) + (h+ b+ r)CT (Q,x), ∀x.
(2.19)
Let Ω = {0, 1}n denote the set of all possible 0, 1 combination vectors with n di-
mensions, and ωi represent the ith element in the vector ω ∈ Ω. The total number of
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(xi −Qi)− (h+ b+ r)ωT
T∑
i=1
(xi −Qi) ≥ 0, ∀x,ω.
(2.20)
Note that each constraint is quadratic in x. By choosing x that minimizes the quadratic

















ωi + (h+ b+ r)ωT
]
≥ 0, ∀ω (2.21)
zt ≥ 0.
The new set of constraints are convex sets. By replacing the fractions with new variables,









t )zt + λ
s.t.
∑T











i=t ωi + (h+ b+ r)ωT − yt]2 + (zt − sωt)2 ≤ (zt + sωt)2, ∀sωt
zt ≥ 0.
(2.22)
Together with the outer optimization problem in (2.17), the multi-period distribution-



























i=t ωi + (h+ b+ r)ωT − yt]2 + (zt − sωt)2 ≤ (zt + sωt)2, ∀sωt
zt ≥ 0, Qt ≥ 0.
(2.23)
From the solution of (2.22), we can compute the worst-case distribution function, and
(2.23) gives the optimal order quantities under the worst-case distribution. The next
theorem on the worst-case distribution function hold for problems with T periods.
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Theorem 7. In a T-period distribution-free model, the worst-case demand distribution
has at most T + 1 points.
Proof. First, by the complementarity conditions, if the optimal solution to (2.18) has a
strictly positive mass at x, then it must be that the corresponding constraint in (2.19)
holds as equality for that x at an optimal solution (y∗, z∗, λ∗). In the following, we show
that for any dual optimal solution (y∗, z∗, λ∗), there exist at most T + 1 xs such that
constraints in (2.19) hold as equality.
To show this, it suffices to show that for any given dual optimal solution (y∗, z∗, λ∗),
there exist at most T + 1 ω ∈ Ω such that (2.21) holds as equality. This is because,
first, z∗t > 0 at optimal for all t. Otherwise (2.19) cannot hold for all x. Then, given
a ω ∈ Ω, the left hand side of (2.20) is a strictly convex function of x. So, a unique
minimizer exists. Thus, for each ω, there is only one possible x such that (2.20) hold
as equality. Therefore, the number of xs that make the constraints in (2.19) hold as
equality is no more than the number of ωs that makes (2.21) hold as equality.
Finally, we show that there are at most T + 1 ω ∈ Ω such that (2.21) holds as
equality. In the following, we use (ω) to denote the value of the left hand side of (2.21)
for that ω. We will show that if (ω1) = (ω2) = 0, it must be ω1 ≤ ω2 or ω2 ≤ ω1,
where “≤” means component-wise. Apparently, if this is true, then there will be at
most T + 1 ωs which satisfy (ω) = 0.
Consider (ω1) = (ω2) = 0 and ω1 6= ω2. Let ω̄ = ω1∨ω2 and ω = ω1∧ω2 where ∨
and ∧ mean component-wise maximum and minimum. If neither ω1 ≤ ω2 nor ω2 ≤ ω1
hold, then {ω1,ω2, ω̄,ω} are four distinct vectors. We first argue that we must have
(ω̄) = (ω) = 0, too. This is because the left hand side of (2.21) is submodular in ω
when z∗t > 0 (it is easy to verify that all cross-partial derivatives for ω are less than 0).
Therefore, the minimizers of the left hand sides of (2.21) must form a sublattice Topkis
(1978). Note that when (ω1) = (ω2) = 0, they must be minimizers of the left hand side
of (2.21) since it cannot be less than zero on [0, 1]n. Therefore, if (ω1) = (ω2) = 0, ω̄
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and ω must also be minimizers, i.e. (ω̄) = (ω) = 0. However, we have












−ω1i + (h+ b+ r)(ω̄T − ω1T )]
< 0,
where the first equality is because ω̄i − ω1i = ω2i − ωi for all i, and the last inequality
is because z∗t > 0 and ω̄i ≥ ω1i for all i while ω̄i > ω1i for at least one i (since ω̄ 6= ω1).
This contradicts with (ω̄) = (ω) = 0. Thus, if (ω1) = (ω2) = 0, it must be either
ω1 ≤ ω2 or ω2 ≤ ω1. Therefore, the theorem is proved. 
Therefore, Theorem 7 combined with formulation (2.23) presents an extension of
Scarf’s result to the multi-period case. Particularly, one can view Scarf’s result as a
special case of our reslut when T = 1.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the optimal pricing problem for selling to a multi-period
newsvendor. We derived a procedure for solving the optimal prices in the problem,
as well as some comparative statics. We also find that the optimal pricing sequence
is decreasing in time under our model. In addition, in the constant pricing model,
the retailer’s optimal order quantity should be decreasing over time. The last part of
this chapter focuses on a distribution-free multi-period newsvendor model and shows a
property of the worst-case demand distribution.
One important future research direction is to consider the amount of time each item
has been sitting in the inventory. Another way to describe this is the time before ex-
piration. Although one motivation of our model is from the fresh produce industry
in which shelf life is important, we have not explicitly taken that into account in our
model. One way to incorporate inventory shelf life is to track the shelf life of each
unit, and expire the unit after a certain day. However, this will lead to much more
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complicated models and solutions because each unit needs to be tracked individually
in every period instead of the total inventory level. Rather than using It to denote
the inventory level in period t, the inventory level should be characterized as Int , where
n represents the number of periods this inventory is in the system. It would be inter-
esting to study how the optimal pricing and ordering strategy would change in this case.
Chapter 3
Supply Chain Risk and Return
Analysis
3.1 Introduction and Literature Review
This chapter focuses on the risk analysis in a supplier-retailer relationship. Risk-return
analysis has long been applied to study inventory control and pricing policies. For
example, Bouakiz and Sobel (1992), Buzacott et al. (2011) performed a risk analysis
for different types of inventory control models. He and Zhang (2008), Lau and Lau
(1999) studied risk analysis for supply chain contracts, pricing and return policies.
There are also papers on supply chain channel coordination Choi et al. (2008). For
risk analysis for the newsvendor, Chen and Federgruen (2010) used the mean-variance
approach to analyze the classic newsvendor model without considering the backorder
cost. Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) studied the effect of risk aversion for a newsvendor model
without backorder cost. Lau (1980) used the mean-standard deviation approach to study
the newsvendor model. Two papers that considered backorder costs in the risk analysis
and provided some useful results for the risk-averse newsvendor model are Wang and
Webster (2009), Wu et al. (2009). In Wang and Webster (2009), the objective function
used is a loss aversion utility function. Their main result states that a loss-averse
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newsvendor will order less than a risk neutral newsvendor if he faces low shortage cost,
and order more if he faces high shortage cost. In Wu et al. (2009), the authors adopt the
mean-variance tradeoff approach. They derived the profit function variance and studied
its properties. In addition, their numerical tests showed that mean-variance analysis
leads to a lower optimal order quantity and a lower optimal value. Ozler et al. (2009)
studied a single-period multi-product newsvendor model using value-at-risk approach.
They provided exact distribution function for the two-product newsvendor problem and
an approximation method for N -product case. Rubio-Herrero et al. (2015) considered
a single-period single product newsvendor who has the decision of order quantity and
selling price. They used a mean-variance approach and their objective is to maximize
the expected revenue minus variance with a scaled parameter. They proved concavity
of the objective function and existence of a unique optimal solution.
The classic newsvendor model adopts a wholesale-price contract. In this model,
the retailer purchases inventory from the supplier at the wholesale price p then sells it
to the mass consumer at the retail price r. There are no other transactions between
the supplier and the retailer. The wholesale-price contract is common and easy to
understand. We refer the readers to Cachon (2003) for a brief introduction and do not
further elaborate here. One thing to point out here is that the supplier in a wholesale-
price contract does not face any uncertainty. Thus, the supplier’s revenue is generally
low compared with the retailer’s expected profit. In the second part of this chapter,
we include a spot market in the classic newsvendor model. A spot market is a place
where the consumer can purchase the item if it is out of stock at the retailer’s side.
There is existing literature on the supply chain spot market purchasing strategy (see
Haksöz and Seshadri (2007)), most of which discuss how retailers should strategically
mix fixed-term contracts with spot market purchases to maximize profit or minimize
purchase cost. Seifert et al. (2004) derived the optimal ordering strategy to purchase
from the regular contract and the spot market. The paper also discusses the case where
the retailer could both buy and sell on the spot market. Golovachkina (2003) studied
the buyer-seller coordination in a spot market. This paper assumes the spot market
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price is stochastic and there is an infinite supply. They derived the optimal strategy
for the seller and showed how the market can be coordinated using contracts. We focus
specifically on the supplier’s problem. We assume the supplier provides inventory to
both the retailer and the spot market. The supplier can choose the wholesale price, but
the spot market price is the retail price. We are also interested in the supply chain risk
sharing when there exists a spot market.
Another model we study in this chapter is the revenue-sharing contract. According
to Lariviere (1999), Cachon and Lariviere (2005), and Yao et al. (2008), price-only con-
tracts cannot coordinate the supply chain. The optimal price depends on the demand
distribution’s coefficient of variation. In a revenue-sharing contract, the retailer pays
the supplier a wholesale price upon purchase, plus a percentage (1 − φ) of the rev-
enue. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) studied the revenue-sharing contracts and showed
how revenue-sharing contracts coordinate the supply chain. The authors also discussed
some limitations of the revenue-sharing contracts which restrained its popularity. Some
literature compares the revenue-sharing contract with other types of contracts. A work
that is closely related to ours is Pasternack (2002). The author compared the classic
wholesale-price contract newsvendor model with a revenue-sharing contract model. Two
types of contracts are presented to the retailer. The retailer chooses the best contract(s)
to use. This work assumes that the wholesale price is fixed but the supplier could con-
trol the price in the revenue-sharing contract. The optimal ordering strategy of which
contract(s) to choose under certain conditions and the optimal order quantities are pre-
sented. It also investigates how to achieve supply chain coordination using contracts.
Our work differs from this work in the following aspects. First, our model does not
involve choosing between contracts. The retailer is presented with the revenue-sharing
contract only. Second, we focus on the supplier’s optimal pricing strategy as well as
the retailer’s ordering strategy in the presence of φ. Third, we study how φ affects the
supplier and the retailer’s profit expectation and variance and look at the risk-return
trade-off. A work that compares revenue-sharing contract with buyback contracts is
Zhang et al. (2015). This paper argues that buyback contracts and revenue-sharing
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contracts are not equivalent when the supplier’s loss aversion is taken into consider-
ation. Furthermore, the critical ratio affects the supplier’s choice between contracts
and the supplier’s expected profit. Researchers also used other approaches to study
the revenue-sharing contract. Qin and Yang (2008) studied the revenue-sharing con-
tract using a Stackelberg game approach and showed that the party that keeps more
than half of the revenue should act as the leader of the game. In Yao et al. (2008),
the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and sells to two competing retailers using
a revenue-sharing contract. This paper studied the impact of demand variability on
pricing and ordering decisions.
In this chapter, we focus on the single-period newsvendor models. To measure the
return, we use the expected profit. To measure the risk, we use the profit variance. We
first study the classic wholesale-price contract. Under this contract, the supplier does
not face any uncertainty. The supply chain’s risk is all on the newsvendor’s (retailer’s)
side. We study what the risk-return profile looks like for the retailer and how the return
of the supply chain is split between the supplier and the retailer. We start our analysis
with a simple two-point distribution. Then we extend the analysis to a three-point
distribution model. The retailer’s risk-return curves and the optimal distributions can
be characterized in closed-form expressions. From there, we generalize the analysis to
the multi-point distributions and the continuous distributions. Moreover, we derive the
lower bounds of the supplier’s portion of the supply chain’s total profit in the multi-
point distribution model. The lower bounds suggest that the supplier is guaranteed
to gain a proportion of the supply chain profit regardless of the demand distribution.
The continuous model requires solving a sequence of infinite programs. To overcome
this challenge, we provide an approximation algorithm that solves the risk-return curve
efficiently.
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3.2 Supply Chain Risk Analysis
In this section, we study the relationship between the retailer’s expected profit and the
profit variance in a supply chain. We consider a single-period newsvendor model. In this
model, there is a retailer facing random demand D. The retailer uses the newsvendor
ordering policy to place an order with the supplier before the beginning of the selling
period. The supplier charges a price p for each unit of good sold, and the pricing decision
is made by maximizing his own revenue. The market price for the item is r.
3.2.1 Two-Point Distribution Risk-Return Analysis
We first study the case when the random demand D follows a two-point distribution
with P (D = d1) = x1 and P (D = d2) = x2, where d1 ≤ d2 and x1 + x2 = 1, x1, x2 ≥ 0.
We assume the mean of D is µ. In the following, we compute the minimal profit variance
the retailer needs to incur (across different demand distributions) if he wants to achieve
an expected profit of t.
It is easy to see that under such a two-point distribution, there are two possible
order quantities Q∗ for the retailer and the corresponding scenarios are described as
follows:
1. Q∗ = d1: In this case, the optimal price for the supplier is p
∗ = r, and the
supplier’s revenue is rd1. The expected value and the variance of the retailer’s
profit are both 0;
2. Q∗ = d2: In this case, the optimal price for the supplier is p
∗ = (1 − x1)r, and
the supplier’s revenue is (1−x1)rd2. The retailer’s expected profit under this case





2 − 2x2d2µ+ x22d22 − x21d21).
Without loss of generality, we normalize r = 1 in the subsequent discussions. In the
following, we find the two-point distribution that gives the minimum profit variance for
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1 + (1− x1)d22 − 2(1− x1)d2µ+ (1− x1)2d22 − x21d21
s.t. x1d1 + (1− x1)d2 = µ;
x1d1 = t;
d1 ≤ (1− x1)d2;
0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1;
d2 ≥ d1 ≥ 0.
(3.1)
In (3.1), the equality constraints are the demand expectation constraint and the retailer’s
profit expectation constraint. The first inequality constraint requires that the supplier’s
revenue from charging price r be less than that from charging price (1− x1)r. That is,
the supplier will prefer case 2.
Now, we analyze the optimal solution to (3.1). First, we argue that if µ < 2t, then
the problem is infeasible. In other words, if the mean of the demand is µ, then it is not
possible for the retailer to achieve an expected profit of more than µ/2. To see this, we
note that by the second and third constraints, (1 − x1)d2 ≥ d1 ≥ x1d1 = t. Therefore,
by the first constraint, µ = x1d1 + (1− x1)d2 ≥ 2t. The next theorem gives the optimal
solution to (3.1) when µ ≥ 2t.
Theorem 8. Suppose µ ≥ 2t. The optimal solution to (3.1) is given by










The optimal value is t
3
µ−2t .















s.t. tx1 ≤ µ− t;
0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1.
40
Note that the objective function is convex in x on [0, 1] and achieves minimum at
x1 = t/µ. However, the first constraint requires that x1 ≥ t/(µ − t). Therefore, the
optimal solution is x1 = t/(µ− t), and all the other parts of the theorem follow. 
Profit Standard Deviation





















Figure 3.1: Risk-return curve for various demand mean under two-point distribution
The risk-return curves for different values of demand mean µ are illustrated in Figure
3.1. In Figure 3.1, the region below each curve is a risk-return profile that can be possibly
attained under certain demand distribution, while the region above the curve can’t be
attained by any demand distribution.
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3.2.2 Three-Point Distribution Risk Return Analysis
Next, let’s consider the case with a three-point distribution. Let D denote a three-point
random variable, with P (D = d1) = x1, P (D = d2) = x2, P (D = d3) = x3. We fix the
mean of the demand D to µ. For the retailer, there are three possible optimal order
quantities:
1. Q∗ = d1: In this case, the optimal price for the supplier is p
∗ = r, and the
supplier’s revenue is rd1. The expected value and the variance of the retailer’s
profit are both 0;
2. Q∗ = d2: In this case, the optimal price for the supplier is p
∗ = (1−x1)r, and the
supplier’s revenue is (1− x1)rd2. The retailer’s expected profit under this case is





1 + (x2 + x3)d
2
2 − 2(x2 + x3)d2(x1d1 + (x2 + x3)d2) + d22(x2 + x3)2 − (x1d1)2
)
= r2x1(1− x1)(d2 − d1)2.
3. Q∗ = d3: In this case, the optimal price for the supplier is p
∗ = (1 − x1 − x2)r,
and the supplier’s revenue is (1−x1−x2)rd3. The retailer’s expected profit under



















In the first case, the retailer’s profit is zero. Thus, it is not optimal for the retailer. We
will focus our attention to the optimal distribution in the second and third case.
In the second case, when the supplier chooses price p∗ = (1− x1)r, and the retailer
chooses order quantity Q∗ = d2, the variance minimization problem is (assuming r = 1
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1 + (1− x1)d22 − 2(1− x1)d2(x1d1 + (1− x1)d2) + d22(1− x1)2 − (x1d1)2
s.t. x1d1 + x2d2 + (1− x1 − x2)d3 = µ;
x1d1 = t;
d1 ≤ (1− x1)d2;
(1− x1 − x2)d3 ≤ (1− x1)d2;
0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1;
d3 ≥ d2 ≥ d1 ≥ 0.
Note that the variance in this case is bounded below,
Var = x1d
2
1 + (x2 + x3)d
2
2 − 2(x2 + x3)d2(x1d1 + (x2 + x3)d2) + d22(x2 + x3)2 − (x1d1)2
≥ x1d21 + (x2 + x3)d22 − 2(x2 + x3)d2µ+ d22(x2 + x3)2 − (x1d1)2.
Equality is only achieved when d3 approaches d2. When this happens, this problem






1 + (1− x1)d22 − 2(1− x1)d2µ+ d22(1− x1)2 − t2.
s.t. x1d1 + x2d2 + (1− x1 − x2)d3 = µ;
x1d1 = t;
d1 ≤ (1− x1)d2;
(1− x1 − x2)d3 ≤ (1− x1)d2;
0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1;
d3 ≥ d2 ≥ d1 ≥ 0.
The objective function and most of the constraints are the same except demand ex-
pectation constraint and the inequality on x3d3. Therefore, based on the solution from
the two-point problem, we can create an optimal solution to the three-point problem.
Consider the following distribution









− ε, d∗3 =
(µ− t)2
µ− 2t
+ ε, x∗3 = ε.
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The risk-return curve in this case is also t
3
µ−2t .
Here, we have another result that is similar to the two-point distribution case. If the
mean of the demand is µ, then the retailer’s expected profit must be no more than µ/2.
To see this, we note that by the two inequality constraints, x2d2 +x3d3 ≥ (x2 +x3)d2 ≥
d1 ≥ x1d1 = t. Therefore, by the first constraint, µ = x1d1 + x2d2 + x3d3 ≥ 2t.










s.t. x1d1 + x2d2 + x3d3 = µ;
x1d1 + x2d2 = t;
d1 ≤ x3d3;
(1− x1)d2 ≤ x3d3;
0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1;
d3 ≥ d2 ≥ d1 ≥ 0.
Solving this model should give us the risk-return curve when the supplier uses a price
that makes the retailer order d3. We have the following results from a detailed analysis
of this model.
Theorem 9. Suppose µ ≥ 32 t. The optimal solution to (3.2) is given by































These distributions achieve the retailer’s risk-return curve when demand follows a three-
point distribution.
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Proof. Using the first two equality constraints and dropping the constant −µ2 at the










1− x1 − x2
s.t. d1 ≤ µ− t;









0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1;
d1 ≥ 0.
Constraints (3.2) and (3.3) come from d3 ≥ d2 ≥ d1. The objective function is convex






) = 2x1(d1 − d2) ≤ 0.
Therefore, the objective function is decreasing in d1. Now, we need to find the upper
bound of d1. We focus on the constrains and write them as the bounds of d1.















x1(1− x1 − x2)
.
When µ − t ≤ t/(x1 + x2), or x1 + x2 ≤ t/(µ − t), to minimize the objective function,
we must have d∗1 = µ − t. Substituting this into the optimization problem and further
simplify the problem, we have,
min
x1,x2






s.t. (1− x1)(t− x1(µ− t)) ≤ x2(µ− t);
x1 + x2 ≤ tµ−t ;
0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1.
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The objective function is convex in x1, x2 on the region x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]. Take the partial





(1− x1 − x2)2
− (t− x1(µ− t))
2
x22
= d23 − d22 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the objective function is increasing in x2. To minimize the variance, we need
to find the lower bound of x2. The two constraints in the formulation above gives






0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1.
We can conclude that (1−x1)(t−x1(µ−t))µ−t ≥ 0 from the result of previous analysis. Thus,
we have x∗2 =
(1−x1)(t−x1(µ−t))
µ−t . Substituting this into the optimization problem, we have
min
x1
x1(µ− t)2 + (µ−t)(t−x1(µ−t))1−x1 +
(µ−t)2
1−x1− (1−x1)(t−x1(µ−t))µ−t
s.t. 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1.
In addition to the 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1 feasibility constraint, we could also derive bounds of x1
based on the feasibility constraint from x2. From x
∗
2 ≥ 0, we derive x1 ≤ tµ−t . From
x1 + x2 ≤ 1, we derive x1 ≥ −µ+2tµ−t .
In fact, when µ/2 < t ≤ 2µ/3, the bound on x1 is
−µ+ 2t
µ− t
≤ x1 ≤ 1.
When t ≤ µ/2, the bound on x1 becomes




By setting the derivative of the objective function to zero, we can find the extreme
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Now, we need to verify whether or not this extreme point x̃1 is in the feasible range
that we obtained previously. We conclude the following, x̃1,1 is on the range [−
√
3, 0),
which is out of our feasible region for x1. x̃1,2 is on the range [0, 1) and is increasing
in t. It is a potential minimizer. x̃1,3 is on the range [0, 1]; however, it is greater than
t/(µ− t). x̃1,4 is on the range [1,
√
3], which is also out of the feasible region for x1.
Therefore, the candidate point that minimizes the objective function are x̃1,2 and
two bounds. By taking the second order derivative of the objective function, we conclude
that this function is convex on the feasible region. Therefore, x̃1,2 is the minimizer on
the feasible region.
Given x∗1 = x̃1,2, the distribution that achieves the risk-return curves can be com-
puted through the following relationships,











, x∗3 = 1− x∗1 − x∗2.
Let’s consider another possible scenario of d1. When µ−t > t/(x1 +x2), or x1 +x2 >
t/(µ − t), to minimize the objective function, we must have d∗1 = tx1+x2 . Substituting
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x1 + x2 ≥ tµ−t ; (3.6)
0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1.






1− x1 − x2
.
It is convex in x1, x2 on the region x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]. Take the partial derivative of the













= d23 − d22 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the objective function is increasing in x2. To minimize the variance, we need














µ−t . Substituting this into the
optimization problem, the objective function becomes a constant t(µ− t) + (µ−t)
3
µ−2t . The




µ−t . However, notice the condition on





. When x1 +x2 =
t
µ−t , we have µ− t = t/(x1 +x2),
which is equivalent to the case when d∗1 = µ − t. Therefore, the only optimal solution
for this problem is when d∗1 = µ− t. 
This theorem shows the three-point distribution on the risk-return curve. The func-
tion of the risk-return curve is rather complicated. Therefore, we will not show the
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closed-form here. However, the closed-form is obtained and can be found in Appendix
G at the end. The risk-return curves for different values of demand mean µ are il-
lustrated in Figure 3.2. We use the same base problem as the two-point distribution
example. The curves has similar shape as the two-point distribution curves. The region
below each curve is a risk-return profile that can be attained under certain demand
distribution. The region above the curve cannot be attained by any distribution.
Profit Standard Deviation























Figure 3.2: Risk-return curves for various demand mean under three-point distributions
We can argue that the retailer’s expected profit t cannot be more than 2µ/3. From
the inequality constraints, we have
x3d3 ≥ d1 ≥ x1d1,
x3d3 ≥ (x2 + x3)d2 ≥ x2d2.
Thus, we have 2x3d3 ≥ x1d1 + x2d2 = t. By the first equality constraint, µ = x1d1 +
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x2d2 + x3d3 ≥ 32 t. This upper bound of t is larger than the previous case when order
quantity is d2. Therefore, to achieve the best risk-return trade-off. The optimal order
quantity must be the largest demand, which is d3 in this case.
3.2.3 Multi-Point Distribution Risk-Return Analysis
Next, we consider the case in which the demand distribution is a multi-point distribution
with N being the number of points in the support of the demand distribution. Similar
as previous cases, we can list all the retailer’s optimal decisions and profits.
1. Q∗ = d1: The optimal price to charge the retailer is p
∗ = r. The supplier’s revenue
is rd1. The expected value and the variance of the retailer’s profit are both 0.
2. Q∗ = d2: The optimal price to charge the retailer is p
∗ = (1−x1)r. The supplier’s
revenue is (1−x1)rd2. The retailer’s expected profit is r(x1d1+(1−x1)d2)−p∗d2 =





1 + (1− x1)d22 − (x1d1 + (1− x1)d2)2
)
.
3. Q∗ = d3: The optimal price to charge the retailer is p
∗ = (1 − x1 − x2)r. The
supplier’s revenue is (1 − x1 − x2)rd3. The retailer’s expected profit is r(x1d1 +







2 + (1− x1 − x2)d23 − ((1− x1 − x2)d3 + x1d1x2d2)2
)
.
4. Q∗ = dk: The optimal price to charge the retailer is p
∗ = (1 −
∑k−1
i=1 xi)r. The
supplier’s revenue is (1−
∑k−1
i=1 xi)rdk. The retailer’s expected profit is r
∑k−1
i=1 xidi.






















When the demand distribution follows an N -point distribution, we have the following
results for the retailer’s expected profit.
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Theorem 10. Suppose the demand follows an N -point distribution with expectation µ.
If the supplier’s optimal price results in an order quantity of dk, k = 1, . . . , N , then the
retailer’s expected profit is bounded above by k−1k µ. Furthermore, the efficient frontier
for the N -point distribution is achieved only when Q∗ = dN , with an upper bound of
N−1
N µ. The smallest demand in the optimal distribution is d
∗
1 = µ− t.
Proof. First, we will show that the retailer’s expected profit is bounded above by k−1k µ
when the wholesale price results in an order quantity of dk. In order for each of the













dj , ∀j = 1, . . . , N (3.7)
They indicate that the supplier’s profit from offering price p∗ in each case must be higher
than offer other prices. From these sets of constraints, we can show that when k = 2,






xidk ≥ d1 ≥ x1d1 = t.
Thus, µ =
∑N
i=1 xidi ≥ 2t.















k−1 t. The first result in the theorem follows.
Now, we will show how to compute the multi-point distribution that could achieve
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i=1 xidi = µ;∑N−1







dj , ∀j = 1, . . . , N
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1;
dk ≥ dk−1 ≥ 0.
Using the equality constraints, we can replace xN with 1 −
∑N−1
i=1 xi, replace dN with
(µ− t)/(1−
∑N−1
i=1 xi), and replace dN−1 with (t−
∑N−2
i=1 xidi)/xN−1.























dj , ∀j = 1, . . . , N
0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, ∀j
dj ≥ dj−1 ≥ 0, ∀j.
The objective function is convex in xi and di. Take the partial derivative of the objective












= 2x1(dk − dN−1) ≤ 0.
Thus, the objective function is decreasing in dk for all k ≤ N − 1. To minimize the
objective, the optimal dk can be obtained from the inequality constraints. From xNdN ≥
(1−
∑j−1












When j = 1, the optimal d1 = µ− t.


























We establish a formulation to calculate the risk-return curve for the retailer and
perform a numerical analysis in this case. Suppose the demand distribution is a discrete
random variable taking values at xi, i = 1, . . . , N with probabilities wi, i = 1, . . . , N.
Also, suppose the mean of the demand is µ. In the following, we would like to compute
that given the expected profit of the retailer is t, what is the demand distribution that
gives the retailer the minimum risk. Again, without loss of generality, we assume the
retailer’s selling price r = 1.
To compute that, it is not hard to see that the optimal ordering quantity for the
retailer Q∗ must be equal to one of the xi’s. Suppose Q
∗ = xi∗ , then one can write the


















xj , ∀i = 1, . . . , N∑i∗−1
i=1 xiwi = t;∑N
i=1 xiwi = µ;∑N
i=1wi = 1; wi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
The above is a linear optimization on wi’s. Solving for all such linear optimizations for
i∗ = 1, . . . , N and choose the one that achieves the smallest objective value will give the
distribution that gives the smallest profit variance under return t.
Next, we show the upper bound of the retailer’s expected profit when the mean of
the demand is µ.













xj , ∀j = 1, . . . , N − 1.
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wi)xj ≥ xjwj ,
...




















i=1 xiwi = t. Together with the demand











Therefore, the retailer’s expected profit must be no more than N−1N µ when the demand
follows an N point distribution. Furthermore, when the optimal order quantity is Q∗ =
xi∗ , the retailer’s expected profit must be no more than
i∗−1
i∗ µ. This proof is similar to
the one in the three-point distribution case, so we will not elaborate here. 
Theorem 10 provides an upper bound on the retailer’s expected profit in this supply
chain setting. This result is consistent with what we have seen in the previous sections.












2 t. Another interesting insight from this theorem is that
the more points in a distribution, the higher the retailer’s expected profit. When the
demand mean is µ, the more points in the distribution, the less the variability. When
demand variability is smaller, the retailer expects to make more profit.
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3.2.4 Risk-Return of Continuous Distribution Functions
In this section, we will consider the risk-return model with a continuous demand D.
The demand has probability distribution function f(x) on range [0,M ]. Let E(X) = µ
denote the demand expectation and F (x) denote the cumulative distribution function.
The supplier charges price p for each item and the retailer select the order quantity
using the newsvendor model. For each order quantity Q, the supplier receives revenue
of pQ(p). He chooses a price that maximizes the revenue.
We derive the expression of the retailer’s expected profit and the profit variance.
To make sure the retailer’s optimal order quantity is Q∗, the supplier’s optimal price
should be p∗ = r (1− F (Q∗)). The supplier’s revenue is p∗Q∗ = r (1− F (Q∗))Q∗.

























x2f(x)dx+ (1− F (Q∗))Q∗2 −
(





Without loss of generality, we normalize r = 1. The problem of minimizing profit





x2f(x)dx+ (1− F (Q∗))Q∗2 − ((1− F (Q∗))Q∗ + t)2
s.t. (1− F (Q∗))Q∗ ≥ (1− F (x))x, ∀x ∈ [0,M ] (3.9a)∫ Q∗
0
xdF (x) = t; (3.9b)∫ M
0
xdF (x) = µ; (3.9c)∫ M
0
dF (x) = 1; (3.9d)
dF (x) ≥ 0. (3.9e)
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The decision variable here is the probability distribution function F (x). We are
interested in the distribution function that gives the minimum variance. This is a
infinite program since the distribution is continuous and the number of decision variables
is infinite. When Q∗ and F (Q∗) are fixed, the objective function is linear in f(x).
Let’s denote the smallest point that has a non-zero probability with dmin and the
largest point that has a non-zero probability with dmax. We have the following results.
Theorem 11. Suppose the demand follows a continuous distribution with expectation
µ on range [0,M ]. The distribution only has non-zero probabilities on range [µ− t, Q∗],
which is to say, dmin = µ− t and dmax = Q∗. In addition, the retailer’s expected profit
is bounded above by µ.




xdF (x) = t+
∫ M
Q∗
xdF (x) ≥ t.
For a fixed µ, the maximum expected profit t is obtained when
∫M
Q∗ xdF (x) is at the
minimum. Thus, it requires
∫M
Q∗+ε dF (x) = 0, for any ε > 0, which means any points
larger than Q∗ will have a probability equal to zero. Therefore, we have Q∗ = dmax.
Constraint (3.9a) requires (1 − F (Q∗))Q∗ ≥
∫M
x dF (x)x, for all x ∈ [0,M ]. When
x = dmin, this inequality gives (1−F (Q∗))Q∗ = µ−t ≥ dmin. Since the objective function
is increasing in x, dmin = µ− t at optimal. Therefore, the continuous distribution only
has non-zero probabilities on the range [µ− t, Q∗] at optimal. 
As we can see from this theorem, the continuous case is an extension of the multi-
point distribution case. The smaller point with non-zero probability in the continuous
case, or dmin corresponds to d1 in the multi-point case. We can think of the continuous
case as a multi-point case with N approaching infinity. The upper bound of the retailer’s
expected profit in the multi-point case approaches 1. Thus, the retailer’s expected profit
is bounded above by µ in the continuous case.
The continuous distribution case requires solving an infinite program, which is a
hard problem. In the next section, we present an algorithm to efficiently approximate
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the risk-return curve by reducing the problem dimension. We also show some numerical
results from our approximation algorithm.
3.2.5 Approximation Algorithm and Numerical Results
Due to the fact that the closed-form solution is not obtainable under a continuous dis-
tribution, we will introduce an algorithm to approximate the continuous case. The idea
of the algorithm is to use a discrete distribution with fine granularity to approximate
the continuous distribution. Then we solve for the optimal multi-point distribution
using the results obtained from the previous section. To start with, we define the no-
tation here. Let N denote the number of points used in the discrete distribution, and
D = {d1, . . . , dN} be the support of the demand distribution.
The minimum standard deviation (risk) is the square root of current best. This
algorithm will also produce the optimal probability distribution and the optimal order
quantity under each t. In Step 2, we did not solve the variance minimization prob-
lem directly. Instead, we enumerated α and use it as a constant in the optimization
problem. Introducing the α term simplifies our problem to an LP. Without fixing α
first, the objective function is non-convex, making it difficult for commercial solvers to
solve. Although we’ve increased the number of optimization problems to be solved, each
iteration takes very little time.
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Algorithm 1. N-Point Distribution Risk-Return Approximation Algorithm
1. Select N and fix t. Set current best to a large number M.
2. For k = 1 to N
Let Q = dk.
Let α = min
∑k−1
i=1 xi and ᾱ = max
∑k−1
i=1 xi.
For α = α to ᾱ























dj , ∀i = 1, . . . , N∑k−1
i=1 dixi = t;∑N
i=1 dixi = µ;∑k−1
i=1 xi = α;∑N
i=1 xi = 1;
xi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , N.
If temp value < current best
current best = temp value
current Q = Q
current α = α
distribution= [x1, . . . , xN ]
3. Output t, current best, current Q, and distribution.
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Using this algorithm, we study the risk-return curve of continuous distributions with
support [1, 1000]. We select N = 1000 and integers {1, 2, . . . , 1000} be the support. In
Step 2, the CVX package in MATLAB is used to solve the linear optimization problems.
After the computation, the retailer’s risk-return curve (efficient frontier) is plotted using
the plot function in MATLAB. Figure 3.3 shows the risk-return curves for continuous
distributions with mean equal 30 and 40. As shown on the plot, the shape of the curves
is very similar to what we saw in the two- and three-point distribution cases. Their
upper bounds are µ if the demand upper bound is large enough.
After we’ve computed the continuous distribution risk-return curve, we want to com-
pare the continuous cases with other multi-point cases to see how much of improvement
are there by using a continuous distribution instead of a multi-point case. Figure 3.4
shows the risk-return curves of the continuous distribution, two-point distribution and
three-point distribution when the demand mean is 40. This plot shows that there is a
significant increase in the upper-bound when we increase from a two-point to a three-
point distribution, (23 −
1
2)µ to be exact. However, this effect diminishes dramatically
as the number of points increases. As we use more points in the numerical tests, the
improvement ( nn+1−
n−1
n )µ approaches zero; however, the amount of resource (computa-
tion time and memory usage) used increases fast. What’s even more interesting is that
even in the continuous case, only a few points has significant probability in the optimal
distribution. That is to say, using only a few points to model the demand distribution
could get results that are close to the continuous case.
3.3 Supply Chain Profit Allocation Analysis
In this section, we study the profit allocation problem between the supplier and the re-
tailer in a supply chain. Consider a supplier who sells a single product to a retailer facing
a newsvendor problem. The retailer faces an uncertain demand D with probability den-
sity function f(·) and cumulative distribution function F (·), and uses the newsvendor
ordering policy to decide on the optimal order quantity. The supplier charges a price p























Figure 3.3: Risk-return curve for various demand means under 1000-point distributions
that the retailer sells at is r.
Given a price p, according to the solution to the newsvendor problem, the retailer
will choose order quantity Q(p) = F−1( r−pr ). Based on this, the supplier chooses a price
p to maximize his profit. That is, the supplier chooses p to maximize Π = (p− c)Q(p).
In the following, let p∗ denote the solution that maximizes Π and let Π∗ = (p∗−c)Q(p∗)
and R∗ = rE[min(D,Q(p∗))]− p∗Q(p∗) be the corresponding profit of the supplier and
the retailer respectively. We further define γ = Π
∗
Π∗+R∗ to be the profit division ratio
between the supplier and the retailer. The main result in this section is the following
theorem regarding lower bounds on γ.
Theorem 12. Let γ = Π
∗
Π∗+R∗ be the profit division ratio.
1. If the demand distribution is an n-point distribution, then γ ≥ 1/n.































Figure 3.4: Risk-return curve for various distributions with µ = 40
Proof. We start with the first part of the theorem. Suppose the demand follows
an n-point distribution with support di, i = 1, . . . , n, where di < di+1 for all i. Let
wi = P (D = di) be the probability for each outcome di. In the following analyses, we
will find a set of wis that minimizes the profit division ratio of the supplier γ.
First, we note that for any given price, there exists an optimal ordering strategy
of the retailer that takes value in the set {di}ni=1.1 In the following, we consider
the case when the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity is Q∗ = dk. In this case, the
highest price the supplier can charge (in order for dk to be an optimal order quantity
for the retailer) is p = r(1−
∑k−1
i=1 wi). Note that the supply chain’s expected profit is
divided between the supplier and the retailer. When fixing the retailer’s expected profit
to t, minimizing γ is equivalent to minimizing supplier’s profit Π. We consider the
following optimization problem to find the demand distribution that gives the supplier
1 When the retailer’s optimal ordering strategy is not unique, we assume he will choose the largest
ordering quantity, which maximizes the social welfare.
61















wi)− c]dk ≥ [r(1−
j−1∑
i=1
wi)− c]dj , ∀j 6= k, (3.10b)
n∑
i=1
wi = 1; 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (3.10c)
Now we provide some explanations for the above formulation. Given the retailer’s





i=1 widi respectively. Thus, the objective function is the profit division ratio
of the supplier. For Constraint (3.10b), it ensures that the supplier’s profit when using
price p = r(1 −
∑k−1
i=1 wi) is the highest compared to other prices, which guarantees
that the supplier will choose p = r(1−
∑k−1
i=1 wi), and thus, the retailer will choose dk.
Constraints (3.10c) are feasibility constraints for a probability density function.








, ∀j < k. (3.11)





















































where the inequality follows from (3.12). Therefore, if the supplier chooses a price p
such that the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity is dk, then he will receive at least 1/k
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of the total supply chain’s profit. Since the maximum value for k is n, the lower bound
of the profit devision ratio for an n-point distribution is 1/n.
Next, we show that this bound is tight. Fix any 0 < ε < 1, we consider a case with
c = 0 and the following demand distribution:
di =
ε
1/i, i = 1, . . . , n− 1
1, i = n,
with wi =

ε(i−1)/i − εi/(i+1), i = 1, . . . , n− 2
ε(n−2)/(n−1) − ε, i = n− 1
ε, i = n.





widj = rε, ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (3.13)
Therefore, the supplier’s expected profit is rε for all j. Thus, p = rwn is an optimal














When ε approaches 0, γ approaches 1/n. Thus, the lower bound of 1/n is tight.
Next, we prove the second part of the theorem. Consider a demand distribution
with support di, i = 1, . . . , n with di < di+1 for all i. So we have dmin = d1 and
dmax = dn. Again, let wi = P (D = di) be the probability that demand is di. We note
that although our analysis is done using discrete distribution, it can be extended to
continuous distribution in a straightforward way.
Without loss of generality, we assume dmin = 1. To prove the lower bound of γ,
similar to part 1 of the proof, we consider the case where the retailer’s optimal order
quantity is dk. In this case, the highest price the supplier can charge (in order for dk to
be an optimal order quantity for the retailer) is p = r(1 −
∑k−1
i=1 wi). In the following,
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we define a new demand distribution. Let N = dlog2 dke, and
d̃i =
2
i−1, i = 1, . . . , N




l:d̃i≤dl<d̃i+1 wl, i = 1, . . . , N∑
l:dl≥d̃i wl, i = N + 1.





























































where the inequality follows from inequalities (3.11) and the last inequality is because
dj ≥ 12 d̃j′ and
∑k−1

























Next, we show that this bound is tight. We consider a case with c = 0 and the
following demand distribution:
di = 2
i−1, i = 1, . . . , n with wi =
2
−i, i = 1, . . . , n− 1
21−n, i = n.























The second equality is because
∑n









. Thus, the lower bound is tight. 
This theorem suggests that in a supplier-retailer relationship, the supplier is guar-
anteed to obtain a certain proportion of the supply chain profit. In particular, if the
distribution has only few points or the range is narrow, the supplier is guaranteed to
obtain a higher proportion.
3.4 Pricing Policy and Risk-Return Analysis in a Spot
Market
In this section, we consider a newsvendor model with a slight variation. The model
is the same as the original model except that the supplier can produce more than the
retailer’s order quantity and sell the excessive produces on the spot market when the
retailer’s order quantity cannot satisfy the market demand. The sequence of events that
take place are as follows:
Before the start of the first period:
1. The supplier decides the price p. Then the retailer decides Q based on p and
the demand distribution F . The retailer’s problem is the original newsvendor’s
problem without holding and backorder cost. Thus, the optimal order quantity of
the retailer is Q = F−1( r−pp ).
2. The supplier decides how many units u to stock-up as buffer inventory. The buffer
inventory can be sold by the supplier directly to the customer on a spot market at
the retail price. For each unit of inventory, the supplier incurs a production cost
c.
During the selling period:
1. The retailer receives order quantity Q and pays the supplier pQ.
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2. Demand D realizes. The retailer sells the amount min(D,Q) at price r.
3. If the retailer’s order quantity Q < D, the supplier will sell min(u,D−Q) on the
spot market at price r to satisfy the demand. The supplier does not incur any
backorder cost or holding cost. The supplier’s total expected profit is
ΠS = pQ+ rE[min(u, (D −Q)+)]− c(Q+ u). (3.14)
In this model, the supplier can use two leverages to maximize his profit: the price
and buffer inventory. We have the following theorem for the optimal decisions of the
supplier.
Theorem 13. Consider a supply chain setting with a spot market where the supplier
could produce buffer inventory u to meet unsatisfied demand. The supplier’s optimal
price and buffer inventory are in the following form,




)− F−1(r − p
r
),
where c is the supplier’s production cost, r is the market price, and F (·) is the
CDF of the demand distribution.
2. The optimal price is p∗ = r, and under this price, the optimal buffer inventory is
u∗ = F−1( r−cr ).
Proof. In this model, the decision process can be broken down into two stages. In the
first stage, the supplier decides the optimal price p∗. In the second stage, he selects
the optimal buffer inventory u∗ based on the retailer’s order decision Q∗. To find the
optimal decisions, we analyze the two decisions separately in a reverse order. We first
study the optimal buffer inventory when the price p is already determined. Under price
p, the retailer orders Q∗ = F−1( r−pr ). The supplier then chooses the buffer inventory to
maximizes the expected profit,





Q∗+u uf(D)dD − cu
s.t. u ≥ 0.
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Here, we left out the term pQ∗ − cQ∗ because it is not relevant in the decision of u.
Based on the first order condition, we have
∂ΠS
∂u
= ruf(u+Q∗)− ruf(Q∗ + u) + r(1− F (Q∗ + u))− c
= r(1− F (Q∗ + u))− c = 0.
Therefore, the optimal buffer inventory under price p is u∗ = F−1( r−cr )− F
−1( r−pr ).
Next, we solve for the optimal price p∗ and maximize the supplier’s total expected
profit. Substituting u∗ into (3.14),






Q∗+u uf(D)dD − c(Q
∗ + u)
s.t. p ≥ 0.
To find the optimal price p, let’s take the first order derivative of ΠS , but this time, u






































From the first order condition, the optimal price p∗ must satisfy p∗ = r and the optimal
buffer inventory is u∗ = F−1( r−cr ). 
Theorem 13 shows a very interesting result. It indicates that when the supplier
maximizes the expected profit, his optimal price is the market price, which leaves the
retailer’s optimal order quantity to be 0. Then, the supplier chooses the buffer inventory
in a similar style as a newsvendor and faces the market demand directly. In other words,
to maximize the expected profit, the supplier should take over the retailer’s role. From
the discussion in Section 3.2 we know that the retailer makes a profit by willing to take
the risk before the demand realizes, and the more risk he is willing to take, the more
profit he makes. In the original model, the supplier does not take any risk but can still
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take a fixed amount of profit. However, when the supplier is given the power to fully
engage in the market, he is willing to sacrifice the “zero-risk” profit for the “high-risk”
profit. For the supplier to obtain the maximum profit, a necessary thing to do is take
all the market risk. Thus, the supplier’s decision is to choose a price to minimize the
retailer’s order quantity and sell directly to the market demand.
Another observation from this theorem is that when the supplier’s profit is maxi-
mized, the two-echelon supply chain structure becomes centralized. One can think of
it as downstream supply chain integration by the supplier. This is a common practice
in supply chain management, and Theorem 13 provides some insights from the profit
aspect on why suppliers prefer to integrate the retailers downstream.
As we mentioned, the supplier now faces uncertainty by having a buffer inventory
before the demand realizes. Therefore, we are interested in the amount of risk the
supplier takes. When the supplier uses price p and buffer inventory u, his profit function
can be expressed in the following three expressions.
1. D ≤ Q∗. Profit = pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u).
2. D ∈ (Q∗, Q∗ + u]. Profit = pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u) + r(D −Q∗).
3. D > Q∗ + u. Profit = pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u) + ru.




(pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u))2f(D)dD +
∫ Q∗+u
Q∗




(pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u) + ru)2f(D)dD − (E[profit])2
= −2rQ(pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u))(F (Q∗ + u)− F (Q∗)) + (pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u))2




(r2(D −Q∗)2 + 2rD(pQ∗ − c(Q∗ + u)))f(D)dD






From the proof of Theorem 13, we know that F (Q∗ + u) = r−cr and F (Q
∗) = r−pr . Use
these to simplify the profit variance function and obtain











































The last two equalities follow from integration by parts.
To see how the supplier’s risk behaves as a function of p, we select a few common
distributions to compute the profit variance. In the Uniform distribution with range
[a, b], the CDF is F (x) = x−ab−a . The retailer’s order quantity is Q
∗ = (r−p)(b−a)r + a and
the supplier’s buffer inventory satisfies u + Q∗ = (r−c)(b−a)r + a. The supplier’s profit
variance as a function of p is
Var(p) =
(b− a)2(p− c)2(4r(2c+ p)− 3(p+ c)2)
12r2
.
The supplier’s profit expectation as a function of p is






− c(Q∗ + u)
=
(p− c)(b(2r − c− p) + a(c+ p+ 4r))
2r
.
Now, let’s look at some numerical experiments with a uniform distribution on
[0, 100]. We set c = 1/50, r = 1. For each value of price p ∈ [c, r], we evaluate the
supplier’s profit standard deviation and profit expectation. Figure 3.5 shows the profit
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risk-return curve and the relationship between price and profit standard deviation on
the right-hand side y-axis. As we can see from Figure 3.5, profit standard deviation and
profit expectation both increase with the price. In addition, the profit standard devi-
ation has an upper bound which comes from the variance of the uniform distribution.




(r − c)3(r + 3c)
r2
.



































Figure 3.5: Supplier’s profit standard deviation and expectation under a uniform dis-
tribution
Another continuous distribution we consider is the exponential distribution. The
retailer’s order quantity is Q∗ = ln(r/p)λ , and the supplier’s optimal buffer inventory
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satisfies u+Q∗ = ln(r/c)λ . The supplier’s profit variance as a function of p is
Var(p) =
−e−2(Q∗+u)λr2(1− 2euλ + e2uλ − 2e(Q∗+2u)λ + 2e(Q∗+u)λ(1 + uλ))
λ2
=
(p− c)(c− p+ 2r)− 2cr ln(p/c)
λ2
.
The supplier’s profit expectation as a function of p is








p− c+ p ln(r/p)− c ln(r/c)
λ
.
We show a numerical example with an exponential distribution with parameter λ =
1/50. Again, we set c = 1/40, r = 1. The supplier’s price range from c to r. We plot the
supplier’s profit standard deviation and expectation as functions of the price. Figure 3.6
shows the profit standard deviation and expectation under the exponential distribution
with λ = 1/50. Again, we can see that the profit standard deviation and expectation
are increasing in price and there exists an upper bound for the profit standard deviation
which is achieved when p = r,
Var =
r2 − c2 − 2cr ln(r/c)
λ2
.
Comparing the uniform distribution and exponential distribution that has the same
mean, we can see that when the price is p = r = 1, the uniform distribution achieves a
slightly higher expected profit, at the cost of a much higher profit standard deviation.
3.5 Optimal Policies in the Revenue-Sharing Contract
In our original model, the supplier charges a price for each unit he sells to the retailer.
The supplier keeps his profit and is not responsible for any unsold units of the retailer.
The retailer takes all the risks in the market and makes a profit from taking the risks.
71

































Figure 3.6: Supplier’s profit standard deviation and expectation under an exponential
distribution
Under such a model, members of the supply chain are only concerned about their own
performance. This usually results in low supply chain profit overall Cachon (2003).
To facilitate collaboration and maximize the total supply chain profit, members of a
supply chain could participate in contracts that award others a portion of the firms’
profit. One type of contract that achieves this goal is the revenue-sharing contract. In
a revenue-sharing contract, the retailer takes only a portion φ of the profit and shares
(1 − φ) of his revenue with the supplier in addition to the purchase price. We assume
the inventory left at the end of the period has a salvage value of v per unit. To avoid
arbitrage opportunity, the salvage value should not exceed the purchase price, i.e., v ≤ p.
This salvage revenue is also shared between the supplier and the retailer. The retailer’s
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profit function is
ΠR(p,Q, φ) = φrmin(Q,D) + φv(Q−min(Q,D))− pQ
= φ(r − v) min(Q,D)− (p− φv)Q.
Thus, the total profit of the supplier is
ΠS(p, φ) = pQ+ (1− φ)((r − v) min(Q,D) + vQ).
Revenue-sharing contracts induce the supplier to choose a price that will optimize
the overall supply chain revenue by aligning the supply chain profit with each firms’
objective. Such type of contract can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allo-
cate the profit. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) studied the strengths and limitations of
revenue-sharing contracts through analysis. Mortimer (2008) provided evidence that the
introduction of revenue-sharing contracts increased the total profit in the video rental
industry by 7%.
In a revenue sharing contract between the supplier and the retailer, the following
events take place in order.
1. The supplier decides the sale price to the retailer (p). The supplier and retailer
also agree on the portion of profit that is kept by the retailer (φ). In other words,
the supplier receives r(1−φ) for each unit sold and v(1−φ) for each unsold unit.
2. The retailer chooses the optimal order quantity Q based on the price p to maximize
the expected profit function.
3. At the beginning of the selling period, the retailer receives order quantity Q and
pays the supplier pQ.
4. Demand D realizes. The retailer sells the amount min(D,Q) at price r. If there
are any unsold units by the end of the period, the retailer receives v per unit as
salvage revenue. The retailer pays the supplier 1 − φ of his revenue. Therefore,
the retailer’s actual profit is
ΠR = φ(r − v) min(Q,D)− (p− φv)Q.
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5. The supplier’s total profit is
ΠS = pQ+ (1− φ)((r − v) min(Q,D) + vQ).
In this section, we first study the supplier’s optimal strategies and the retailer’s optimal
response. For a revenue-sharing contract, we have the following theorem for the supplier
and the retailer.
Theorem 14. Let f(·) and F (·) denote the PDF and the CDF of the demand distribu-
tion on [dmin, dmax], respectively. In a revenue-sharing contract with φ being the revenue
kept by the retailer, the supplier’s optimal price p∗ falls under one of the following cases,





, the optimal price is p∗ =
φv.





, the optimal price is p∗ =
φr.
3. Otherwise, the optimal price p∗ must satisfy
p∗ = φ2(r − v)f(F−1(ξ))F−1(ξ), (3.15)
where ξ = φr−pφ(r−v) .
The retailer’s optimal order quantity under this price p∗ is Q∗ = F−1( φr−p
∗
φ(r−v)).
Proof. We first show how to obtain the retailer’s optimal order quantity for a given
price p. Although in the revenue-sharing contract model, a term φ and a salvage value
v are introduced, the retailer’s problem is still a newsvendor problem. We can think
of φ(r − v) as the market price and p − φv as the purchase cost. Therefore, under a
certain price p, the retailer’s optimal order quantity is Q∗ = F−1(φ(r−v)−(p−φv)φ(r−v) ), where
φr − p ≥ 0.
Next, we show the proof of the first part of the theorem. To arrive at the supplier’s
optimal price, we start from the supplier’s profit maximization problem. The following
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problem is used to find the optimal price p∗ that maximizes the supplier’s expected
profit,








s.t. p ≤ φr,
p ≥ 0.
The objective function simplifies to
ΠS = pQ











Take the derivative of ΠS with respect to p,
∂ΠS
∂p





























where ξ = φr−pφ(r−v) .



























and p ≥ φv. Therefore, the
supplier’s expected profit is decreasing in p. The optimal price is the lower bound of p
which is p∗ = φv.
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Therefore, the supplier’s expected profit is increasing in p. The optimal price is the
upper bound of p which is p∗ = φr.
In case 3, the supplier’s expected profit is non-monotone in p. The optimal price













Thus, the optimal price must satisfy,
p∗ = φ2(r − v)f(F−1(ξ))F−1(ξ).

When a specific demand distribution and a set of parameters are given, the optimal
price and order quantity can be calculated using Theorem 14. The revenue-sharing
parameter φ also plays a part in the supplier’s and the retailer’s decision. In the first
two cases, the supplier’s prices are increasing in φ. This result is consistent with what
we see in practice. When φ is high, the retailer keeps more profit to himself and the
supplier receives less from the retailer. To maximize the supplier’s revenue, it is optimal
to increase the wholesale price. In the third case, the effect of φ on the supplier’s decision
depends on the form of the demand distribution. We will look at some specific cases
later in this section.
In the following part, we study the supplier and the retailer’s risk-return trade-off.
We will use Q∗ and p∗ to denote the supplier and retailer’s optimal decisions solved
from this theorem. Given that the retailer places the optimal order quantity Q∗(p∗)
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(p∗Q∗ + (1− φ)((r − v)D + vQ∗))2 f(D)dD +
∫ ∞
Q∗
(p∗Q∗ + (1− φ)rQ∗)2f(D)dD
−(EΠS)2.
Under the optimal price p∗, the retailer’s profit expectation is
EΠR = φ(r − v)
(∫ Q∗
0
Df(D)dD +Q∗(1− F (Q∗))
)
− (p∗ − φv)Q∗








(φ(r − v)D − (p∗ − φv)Q∗)2f(D)dD + (φ(r − v)Q∗ − (p∗ − φv)Q∗)2(1− F (Q∗))
−(EΠR)2.
The next corollary discusses the effect of φ on the supplier and the retailer’s decision
and profit expectation and variance.














the optimal price is increasing in φ.
When φ is outside of the range, the supplier’s optimal price p∗ is increasing in φ




































The retailer’s optimal order quantity is decreasing in φ when demand distribution and
price satisfy p∗ − φdp
∗





Proof. To start with, we first look at how price p∗ changes with φ. When φ is within
the range in (3.16) and (3.17), the optimal price is φv and φr, respectively. It is clear
that the optimal price is increasing in φ.
For φ that is outside of this range, we take the derivative of condition (3.15). To
simplify notation, we use RHS to denote the right-hand side of (3.15). Remember that




















For each term in the equation above, we have
∂RHS
∂φ


















































dφ ≥ 0 and p
∗ is increasing in φ.
Next, we study the retailer’s optimal order quantity. The partial derivative of Q∗
























This derivative is nonpositive when p∗ − φdp
∗
dφ ≤ 0, meaning the optimal order quantity
is decreasing in φ. Otherwise, the optimal order quantity is increasing in φ. 
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The effect of φ on the retailer’s expected profit can be derived from the partial derivative





φQ∗f(Q∗) , the retailer’s expected
profit is increasing in φ. Otherwise, it is decreasing in φ.
For the supplier’s expected profit, we have
dEΠS
dφ
= (−r + v)
∫ Q∗
0



































dφ . To see some concrete results on how
φ influences each party’s optimal decision and profit, we study some specific groups of
distributions in the next section.
3.5.1 Revenue-Sharing Contracts Under Common Distributions
In this section, we consider some common distributions and analyze the effect of φ on
the supplier and the retailer’s decisions. Specifically, we look at the uniform distribution
and the exponential distribution.
Uniform Distribution













+ φ(φr − p∗).
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Solving for p∗ we have
p∗ =
φ2(br − av)
(1 + φ)(b− a)
.
The optimal order quantity is
Q∗ = a+




(r − v)(1 + φ)
.
Here, we can see the optimal price is increasing in φ and the optimal order quantity is
decreasing in φ. When φ = 1, the retailer keeps all the profit. In order to maximize the
profit, the supplier will charge the highest price, resulting in a smaller order quantity
from the retailer. When φ = 0, the supplier takes the entire supply chain’s profit.
To maximize the profit, the supplier should choose the lowest price (0 in this case),
resulting in a larger optimal order quantity. This is because reducing the retailer’s
purchase price encourages the retailer to increase the order quantity under the same
demand distribution and market price. This will increase the expected number of units
sold, in turn, improving the retailer’s profit. Since all the profit is shared with the
supplier, the supplier’s profit is maximized.
Figure 3.7 shows a numerical example of the optimal price and order quantity as a
function of φ. In this example, we use a model with uniform distribution on [0, 100].
The market price is r = 1. The retailer receives a salvage value of v = 0.2 per unit from
the unsold inventory. The supplier’s optimal price is increasing in φ, which is shown in
black and the retailer’s optimal order quantity is decreasing in φ, which is shown in red.
Next, we look at the profit expectation and variances. The retailer’s expected profit
under a uniform distribution is











2(b− a)(r − v)(1 + φ)2
.


































Figure 3.7: The optimal price and order quantity for various φs when D ∼ Unif[0, 100]










Q∗2(−p+ rφ)2(p∗ − vφ)
(r − v)φ
+
Q∗3(3p∗2 − 3p∗(r + v)φ+ (r2 + rv + v2)φ2)
3(−a+ b)
− (EΠR)2.
Figure 3.8 shows a numerical example of the retailer’s risk-return curve. The x-axis
is the retailer’s profit standard deviation under different values of φ and the left y-axis
is the profit expectation under different φs. The corresponding φ can be found on the
right y-axis. From this figure, we can see that the retailer’s profit standard deviation is
also increasing in φ. Having a larger φ guarantees the retailer a higher expected profit,
but also at a higher risk.
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Figure 3.8: Retailer’s risk-return curve for various φs when D ∼ Unif[0, 100]
The focus of the following part is on the supplier’s risk-return trade-off. The sup-
plier’s expected profit is















2(b− a)(r − v)(1 + φ)
.




supplier’s profit variance is rather complicated once we substitute in the formula of the
optimal order quantity and price, as well as the supplier’s expected profit. Although we
do not show the full closed-form expression here, keep in mind that such an expression
exists and can be computed quickly.
Exponential Distribution
Assume the demand follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ. When φ is
close to zero, the supplier’s expected profit is decreasing in p and the optimal price is
φv. For φs that are outside of the range, when the supplier’s price is p, the retailer’s




λ . In this case, condition (3.15) becomes





= φ(p∗ − φv) ln φ(r − v)
p∗ − φv
.
In this equation, the λ term disappears during simplification, meaning that the supplier’s
optimal price that maximizes the expected profit does not rely on the distribution
parameter. However, the retailer needs to know the demand expectation in order to
find the optimal order quantity. Solving this equation could give us the supplier’s
optimal price for each φ. However, this function does not have a closed-form solution.
To study the monotonicity of p∗ with respect to φ, we take the partial derivative of p



























p+ (p− 2φv) ln φ(r−v)p∗−φv
1 + φ− φ ln φ(r−v)p∗−φv
.
According to the model discussion, we can think of φ(r − v) as the market price and
p − φv as the purchase cost. The retailer’s purchase cost should be lower than the
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, dpdφ is greater than 0, i.e., p is increasing in φ.
Let’s look at a numerical example with λ = 0.02. The cost parameters are still the
same with the other examples, so we have r = 1, v = 0.2. After checking the range of φ
in Theorem 14, it turns out that the optimal p∗ solved from condition (3.15) is outside
of the feasible range [φv, φr]. In fact, the first order partial derivative of the supplier’s
profit function is strictly decreasing in p. Thus, the optimal price is φv. Therefore,
the optimal price is increasing in φ. The corresponding optimal ordering strategy is to
match the maximum demand. When the demand follows an exponential distribution,
the model parameters r, v and φ must satisfy the following relationship to have a p∗





The retailer’s expected profit under an exponential distribution is given below,





1− e−λQ∗(1 + λQ∗)
λ
.
From this, we can see that the retailer’s expected profit is increasing in Q∗.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on the risk-return analysis for several single-period newsven-
dor models. The first model we consider is a classic newsvendor model without holding
cost or salvage values. We show the closed-form solution of the two-point (Section
3.2.1) and the three-point distribution functions (Section 3.2.2) that achieve the maxi-
mum expected profit under a given variance or risk. Next, we generalize the analysis to
the multi-point distributions in Section 3.2.3. We present the linear programs that are
used to find the risk-return curves. We characterize some properties of the risk-return
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curves as well as the optimal distribution. For the continuous distributions, we provide
the model for solving the risk-return curve which is an infinite program. An approxima-
tion algorithm is presented in Section 3.2.4 to efficiently solve for the risk-return curves.
This section also studies the supply chain profit allocation between the supplier and the
retailer. We obtain lower bounds on the proportion of profits gained by the supplier
and the distributions that achieve the lower bounds.
The second model we consider is a spot market model. The retailer still purchases
from the supplier using the classic newsvendor model before the period starts; however,
in this model, there is a spot market where the supplier could sell directly to the
unsatisfied demand. We derive the supplier’s optimal pricing and buffer inventory and
show the supplier’s risk-return curve when demand follows a uniform distribution and
an exponential distribution.
In the first two models, the supplier and the retailer uses a wholesale-price contract.
In the third model, a revenue-sharing contract is adopted. There is a salvage value
for each unsold item for the retailer. Both the retailer’s sales revenue and salvage
revenue are shared with the supplier. In this model, we obtain the optimality condition
for the supplier’s price. We also characterize how φ influences the supplier and the
retailer’s optimal decisions and their profit expectation and variation in closed-form
under uniform and exponential demand distributions.
Chapter 4
Online Learning Algorithms for
Matching Problems
4.1 Introduction and Literature Review
In this chapter, we consider a type of online resource allocation problem — online match-
ing problems. Online matching problems are considered as fundamental problems in
online optimization theory and have important applications in the online advertisement
allocation problems. In the problem we study, there is an underlying weighted bipartite
graph G = (I, J, E) with weights bij for each edge (i, j) ∈ E. The vertices in J arrive
sequentially in some order, and whenever a vertex j ∈ J arrives, the set of weights bij
is revealed for all i ∈ I, (i, j) ∈ E. The decision maker then has to match j to one of
its neighbors i, and a value of bij will be obtained from this matching. In our problem,
the decision maker’s gain from each vertex i is a function of the total matched value to
this vertex, and his goal is to maximize the total gain from all vertices. Mathematically,
the problem can be formulated as follows (assume |I| = m, |J | = n, and let bij = 0 for
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i=1 xij ≤ 1, ∀j
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j,
(4.1)
where xij denotes the fraction of vertex j that is matched to vertex i.
1 In (4.1),
the coefficient bj = {bij}mi=1 is revealed only when vertex j arrives, and an irrevocable
decision xj = {xij}mi=1 has to be made before observing the next input. For each i,
Mi(·) is a nondecreasing concave function with Mi(0) = 0. In this chapter, we assume
that Mi(·)s are continuously differentiable.
As mentioned earlier, online matching problems have a very important application in
the online advertisement allocation problem, which we will later refer to as the Adwords
problem. In the Adwords problem, there are m advertisers (which we also call the
bidders). A sequence of n keywords are searched during a fixed time horizon. Based
on the relevance of the keyword, the ith bidder would bid a certain amount bij to
show his advertisement on the result page of the jth keyword. The search engine’s
decision is to allocate each keyword to one of the m bidders (we only consider a single
allocation in this paper). Note that each allocation decision can only depend on the
information earlier in the arrival sequence but not on any future data. As pointed out
in Devanur and Jain (2012), there are several practical motivations for considering a
concave function of the matched bids in the Adwords problem. Among them are convex
penalty costs for under-delivery in search engine-advertiser contracts, the concavity of
the click-through rate in the number of allocated bids observed in empirical data and
fairness considerations. In each of the situations mentioned above, one can write the
objective as a concave function. We refer the readers to Devanur and Jain (2012) for a
more thorough review of the motivations for this problem. It is worth noting that there
is a special case of this problem where Mi(x) = min{x,Bi}. In this case, one can view
that the bidder has a budget Bi and the revenue from each bidder is bounded by Bi.
One important question when studying online algorithms is the assumptions on the
1 We allow fractional allocations in our model. However, our proposed algorithms output integer
solutions. Thus all our results hold if one confines to integer solutions.
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input data. In this work, we adopt a random permutation model. More precisely, we
assume:
1. The total number of arrivals n = |J | is known a priori.
2. The weights {bij} can be adversarially chosen. However, the order that j arrives
is uniformly distributed over all the permutations.
The random permutation model has been adopted in much recent literature in the study
of online matching problems, see, e.g., Agrawal et al. (2014), Devanur and Hayes (2009),
Feldman et al. (2010), etc. It is equivalent to saying that a set of B = {b̃1, b̃2, ..., b̃n}
is arbitrarily chosen beforehand (unknown to the decision maker). Then the arrivals
b1, b2, ..., bn are drawn randomly without replacement from B. The random permutation
model is an intermediate path between using a worst-case analysis and assuming each
input data is drawn independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a certain
distribution. On one hand, compared to the worst-case analysis (see, e.g., Buchbinder
et al. (2007), Devanur and Jain (2012), Feldman et al. (2009), Mehta et al. (2005)), the
random permutation model is practically reasonable yet much less conservative. On the
other hand, the random permutation model is much less restrictive than assuming the
inputs are drawn i.i.d. from a certain distribution (Devanur (2011)). Also, the assump-
tion of the knowledge of n is necessary for any online algorithm to achieve near-optimal
performance (see Devanur and Hayes (2009)). Therefore, for large problems with rela-
tively stationary inputs, the random permutation model is a good approximation and
the study of such models is of practical interest. Next we define the performance measure
of an algorithm under the random permutation model:
Definition 3 (c-competitiveness). Let OPT be the optimal value for the offline problem
(4.1). An online algorithm A is called c-competitive in the random permutation model
if the expected value of the online solutions by using A is at least c times the optimal










where the expectation is taken over uniformly random permutations σ of 1, ..., n, and
xij(σ,A) is the ijth decision made by algorithm A when the inputs arrive in order σ.
In Devanur and Jain (2012), the authors propose an algorithm for the online match-
ing problem with concave returns that has a constant competitive ratio under the worst-
case model (the constant depends on the forms of each Mi(·)). They also show that a
constant competitive ratio is the best possible result under that model. In this chap-
ter, we propose an algorithm under the random permutation model, which achieves
near-optimal performance under some conditions on the input.
Our main result is stated as follows:
Theorem 15. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1/2). There exists an algorithm (Algorithm DLA) that is
1− ε competitive for the online matching problem with concave returns Mi(·)s under the












where b̄ = 1n mini{
∑n
j=1 bij}, η =
mini,j{bij |bij>0}
maxi,j bij
, and F (M,η) is a constant that only
depends on each Mi(·) and η.
In condition (4.2), b̄ can be viewed as the average bid value of a bidder over time.
Given that each bidder is at least interested in some fractions of the keywords, this
average will go to a certain constant as n becomes large. Also, η can be viewed as the
ratio between the value of the smallest non-zero bid and the highest bid. In practice, this
is often bounded below by a constant by enforcing a reserve price and a maximum price
for any single bid. The exact functional form of F (M,η) is somewhat complicated, and
is given in Proposition 2. Just to give an example, if we choose Mi(x) = x
p (0 < p < 1),
then F (M,η) = 2
η(2−p)/(1−p)
. Therefore, condition (4.2) can be viewed as simply requiring
the total number of inputs is large, which is often the case in practice. For example,
in the Adwords problem, n is the number of keyword searches in a certain period, and
for instance, Google receives more than 5 billion searches per day. Even if we focus
on a specific category, the number can still be in the millions. Thus, this condition
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is reasonable. We note that most learning algorithms in the literature make similar
requirements, see Agrawal et al. (2014), Devanur and Hayes (2009), Molinaro and Ravi
(2014). Furthermore, as we will show in our numerical tests, our algorithm performs well
even for problems with sizes that are significantly smaller than the condition requires,
which validates the potential usefulness of our algorithm.
To propose an algorithm that achieves near-optimal performance, the main idea is
to utilize the observed data in the allocation process. In particular, since the input data
arrives in a random order, using the past input data and projecting it into the future
should present a good approximation for the problem. To mathematically capture this
idea, we use a primal-dual approach. We obtain the dual optimal solutions to suitably
constructed optimization problems and use them to assist with future allocations. We
first propose a one-time learning algorithm (OLA, see Section 4.2) that only solves an
optimization problem once at time εn. By carefully examining this algorithm, we prove
that it achieves near-optimal performance when the inputs satisfy certain conditions.
However, the conditions are stronger than those stated in Theorem 15. To improve our
algorithm, we further propose a dynamic learning algorithm (DLA, see Section 4.3).
The dynamic learning algorithm makes better use of the observed data and updates the
dual solution at a geometric pace, that is, at time εn, 2εn, 4εn and so on. We show
that these resolvings can lift the performance of the algorithm and thus prove Theorem
15. As one will see in the proof of the DLA, the choice of the resolving points perfectly
balances the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, which are the main tradeoffs
in such types of learning algorithms.
It is worth mentioning that a similar kind of dynamic learning algorithm has been
proposed in Agrawal et al. (2014) and further studied in Molinaro and Ravi (2014) and
Wang (2012). However, those works only focus on linear objectives. In our analysis,
the nonlinearity of the objective function presents a non-trivial hurdle since one can
no longer simply analyze the revenue generated in each time segment and add them
together. In this chapter, we successfully work around this hurdle by a convex duality
argument. We believe that our analysis is a non-trivial extension of the previous work.
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Moreover, the problem solved has important applications.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we start with a
one-time learning algorithm and prove that it achieves near-optimal performance under
some mild conditions on the input. The one-time learning algorithm is easy to un-
derstand and shows important insights for designing this class of learning algorithms.
However, it only achieves a weaker performance than what is stated in Theorem 15. In
Section 4.3, we propose a dynamic learning algorithm which makes better use of the
data and has a stronger performance. Some numerical test results of our algorithm
are presented in Section 4.4, which validate the strength of our algorithm. Section 4.5
concludes this chapter.
4.2 One-Time Learning Algorithm
In this section, we first propose a one-time learning algorithm for the online matching






j=1 bijxij = ui, ∀i∑m
i=1 xij ≤ 1, ∀j
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
(4.3)






s.t. yj ≥ bijM ′i(vi), ∀i, j
vi ≥ 0, ∀i
yj ≥ 0, ∀j.
(4.4)
Let the optimal value of (4.3) be P ∗ and the optimal value of (4.4) be D∗. In Devanur
and Jain (2012), the authors proved the weak duality between (4.3) and (4.4). In the
following lemma, we prove that in fact the strong duality holds. The proof of the lemma
is relegated to the Appendix.
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Lemma 2. P ∗ = D∗. Furthermore, the objective value of any feasible solution to (4.4)
is an upper bound of P ∗.









ε xij = ui, ∀i∑m
i=1 xij ≤ 1, ∀j
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
(4.5)
Now we define the one-time learning algorithm as follows:
Algorithm 2. One-Time Learning Algorithm(OLA)
1. During the first εn arrivals, no allocation is made.
2. After observing the first εn arrivals, solve (Pε) and denote the optimal solutions
by x̂ and û.
3. For any m dimensional vector w, q ≥ 0, define
xi(w, q) =
 1 if i = argmaxk {qkM ′k(wk)}0 otherwise. (4.6)
Here, ties among qkM
′
k(wk) are broken arbitrarily. For the (εn + 1)th to the nth
arrival, the allocation rule xij = xi(û, bj) is used.
Now we provide some intuition for the algorithm. The idea of the algorithm is
to use the first εn inputs to learn an approximate û and then use it to make all the
future allocations based on the complementarity conditions between the primal and dual
problems ((4.3) and (4.4)). Here û is solved from (Pε) which projects the allocation in
the first εn inputs to the entire problem. The decision rule in (4.6) can be explained as
choosing the i with the highest product of the nominal bid value bij and the marginal
contribution rate to the total projected reward M ′i(û). Note that a similar idea has
been used to construct algorithms for an online matching problem with linear objective
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functions (see e.g., Devanur and Hayes (2009), Agrawal et al. (2014), Molinaro and
Ravi (2014)). However, the analyses of those algorithms all depend on the linearity of
the objective function which we do not possess in this problem. Instead, an analysis
with the use of concavity is required in our analysis, making it quite different from
those in the prior literature. In the following, we assume without loss of generality that
maxi,j bij ≤ 1 (we can always scale the inputs to make this hold). We also make a
technical assumption as follows:
Assumption 1. The inputs of the problem are in a general position. That is, for
any vector p = (p1, ..., pm) 6= 0, there are at most m terms among arg maxi{bijpi},
j = 1, ..., n, that are not singleton sets.
The assumption says that we only need to break ties in (4.6) no more than m times.
This assumption is not necessarily true for all inputs. However, as pointed out by
Devanur and Hayes (2009) and Agrawal et al. (2014), one can always perturb bij by
adding a random variable ηij taking uniform distribution on [0, η] for some very small
η. By doing so the assumption holds with probability one and the effect to the solution
can be made arbitrarily small. Given this assumption and by the complementarity





bijxi(û, bj) ≤ εûi +m.
We first prove the following proposition about the performance of the OLA, which
relies on a condition of the solution to (Pε).





, then the OLA
is a 1− ε-competitive algorithm.
Before we prove Proposition 2, we define some notation.
• We define the optimal offline solution to (4.3) by (x∗,u∗) with optimal value OPT.
• Define
∑n
j=1 bijxi(û, bj) = ūi, note that ūi normally does not equal ûi.
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We show the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For any given ε ∈ (0, 1/2), if mini ûi ≥ 12m log (m
2n/ε)
ε3
, then with probability
1− ε,
(1− ε)ûi ≤ ūi ≤ (1 + ε)ûi, for all i. (4.7)
Proof. The proof will proceed as follows: For any fixed û, we define that a random
sample (the first εn arrivals) S is bad for this û if and only if û is the optimal solution to
(4.5) for this S, but ūi < (1− ε) ûi, or ūi > (1 + ε) ûi, for some i. First, we show that the




and i. Then, we take a union bound over all distinct i and ûis to prove the lemma.
To start with, we fix û and i. Define Yj = bijxi(û, bj). By Lemma 3 and the
condition on ûi, we have
(1− ε2)εûi ≤ εûi −m ≤
∑
j∈S
Yj ≤ εûi +m ≤ (1 + ε2)εûi.
Therefore, the probability of bad S is bounded by the sum of the following two terms




Yj ≤ ε(1 + ε2)ûi,
∑
j∈N




Yj ≥ ε(1− ε2)ûi,
∑
j∈N
Yj < (1− ε)ûi
 .(4.8)







Yj ≤ ε(1 + ε2)ûi,
∑
j∈N




Zj ≤ ε(1 + ε2)ûi,
∑
j∈N






Zj ≤ ε(1 + ε2)ûi,
∑
j∈N









































Here the second inequality follows from the Hoeffding-Bernstein’s inequality for sam-
pling without replacement, see Lemma 9 in the Appendix. Similarly, we can get the
same result for the second term in (4.8), which is also bounded by δ. Therefore, the
probability of a bad sample is bounded by 2δ for fixed û and i.
Next, we take a union bound over all distinct ûs. We call û and û′ distinct if
and only if they result in different allocations, i.e., xi(û, bj) 6= xi(û′, bj) for some i, j.
Denote M ′i(ûi) = vi. For each j, by the definition in (4.6), the allocation is uniquely
defined by the signs of the following terms:
bijvi − bi′jvi′ , ∀1 ≤ i < i′ ≤ m.
There are m(m−1)/2 such terms for each j. Therefore, the entire allocation profiles for
all the n arrivals can be determined by the signs of no more than m2n differences. Now
we find out how many different allocation profiles can arise by choosing different vs. By










Now we take a union bound over all distinct ûs and i = 1, . . . ,m, and Lemma 4 follows.

Next we show that the OLA achieves a near-optimal solution under the condition
in Proposition 2. We first construct a feasible solution to (4.4):















































































We consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: ūi ≤ ûi. In this case,
Mi(ûi)−Mi(ūi) + (ūi − ûi)M ′i(ûi) ≤Mi(ûi)−Mi(ūi) ≤
∣∣∣∣ ûi − ūiūi
∣∣∣∣Mi(ūi) ≤ 2εMi(ūi),
where the second inequality holds because of the concavity of Mi(·).
• Case 2: ūi > ûi. In this case,
Mi(ûi)−Mi(ūi) + (ūi − ûi)M ′i(ûi) ≤ (ūi − ûi)M ′i(ûi) ≤
∣∣∣∣ ūi − ûiûi
∣∣∣∣Mi(ûi) ≤ εMi(ūi).
Again, the second inequality is due to the concavity of Mi(·).
Thus, under the condition that mini ûi ≥ 12m log (m
2n/ε)
ε3










i=1Mi(ūi) ≥ (1− 2ε)OPT.
Lastly, we note that the actual allocation in our algorithm for i is ũi =
∑n
j=εn+1 bijxi(û, bj)
(since we ignore the first εn arrivals). By Lemma 3, we have
ũi = ūi −
εn∑
j=1
bijxi(û, bj) ≥ ūi − ε(1 + ε2)ûi.











The last inequality is due to the concavity of Mi(·)s and that Mi(0) = 0. Therefore,
given mini ûi ≥ 12m log (m
2n/ε)
ε3
, with probability 1− ε,
m∑
i=1
Mi(ũi) ≥ (1− 5ε)OPT.
Therefore, Proposition 2 is proved. 
Proposition 2 shows that the OLA is near-optimal under some conditions on û.
However, û is essentially an output of the algorithm. Although such types of conditions
are not uncommon in the study of online algorithms (e.g., in the result of Devanur
and Hayes (2009), Feldman et al. (2010)), it is quite undesirable. In the following, we
address this problem by providing a set of sufficient conditions which only depend on
the input parameters (i.e., m, n, bs and M(·)s). We show that our algorithm achieves
near-optimal performance under these conditions. We start with the following lemma.










where b̄ = 1n mini{
∑n
j=1 bij}, η = mini,j{bij |bij > 0} and F (M,η) is such that
M ′i(ηF (M,η)C) < ηM
′
i′(C), ∀i, i′.
Then with probability 1− ε, ûi ≥ C, for all i.
The proof of Lemma 5 is relegated to the Appendix (it is proved together with
Lemma 8). Now combining Proposition 2 and Lemma 5, we have the following result
for the OLA:










where b̄ = 1n mini{
∑n
j=1 bij}, η = mini,j{bij |bij > 0} and F (M,η) is such that
M ′i(ηF (M,η)C) < ηM
′
i′(C), ∀i, i′ (4.11)
with C = 12m log (m
2n/ε)
ε3
. Then the OLA is 1 − ε-competitive under the random permu-
tation model.
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Here we give some comments on the definition of F (M,η). The definition of F (M,η)
basically ensures that we rule out the possibility that one i receives nearly all the
allocation while some others receive almost none. Note that such F (M,η) always exists
and is finite if limx→∞M
′
i(x) = 0 for all i. In practice, this is usually true as there
is usually a upper bound on the possible reward from each bidder i. In particular, if





where M ′−1(·) denotes the inverse function of M ′(·). For example, if one chooses
Mi(x) = x
p (0 < p < 1), then one can further choose F (M,η) ≥ 2
η(2−p)/(1−p)
. Therefore,
in most practical situations, one can view F (M,η) as a constant. Finally, we want to
remark that the conditions in Lemma 5 (or Proposition 3) are only one set of sufficient
conditions which have the nice feature of only depending on the problem inputs. In prac-




they are more favorable. In addition, as we will show in our numerical tests in Section
4.4, our algorithm performs quite well even if some of the conditions in Lemma 5 are
not satisfied. Therefore, the applicability of our algorithm could be well beyond what
the conditions require.
4.3 Dynamic Learning Algorithm
In the previous section, we introduced the OLA that can achieve near-optimal per-
formance. While the OLA illustrates the ideas of our approach and requires solving
a convex optimization problem only once, the conditions it requires to achieve near-
optimality are stricter than what we claim in Theorem 15. In this section, we propose
an enhanced algorithm that lessens the conditions and thus improves the OLA.
The main idea for the enhancement is the following: In the one-time learning algo-
rithm, we only solve a partial optimization problem once. However, it is possible that
there is some error for that solution due to the random order of arrival. If we could
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modify the solution as we gather more data, we might be able to improve the perfor-
mance of the algorithm. In the following, we introduce a dynamic learning algorithm
based on this idea, which updates the allocation policy every time the history doubles;
that is, it computes a new û at time t = εn, 2εn, 4εn, . . . and uses it to perform the








` bijxij = ui, ∀i∑m
i=1 xij ≤ 1, ∀j
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
We further define (x`,u`) to be the optimal solution to (P`).
We define the dynamic learning algorithm as follows:
Algorithm 3. Dynamic Learning Algorithm (DLA)
1. During the first εn arrivals, no allocation is made.
2. For r = 0, 1, ..., for 2rnε < j ≤ 2r+1nε, set xij = xi(u`, bj) for all i, where
` = d2rnεe.
In the following, without loss of generality, we assume that L = − log2 ε is an
integer (otherwise one can just choose a smaller ε and prove the same result). Define
`k = 2
k−1εn, k = 1, ..., L, and define ûk = u`k . We first prove the following proposition:







, then the DLA is 1 − ε-
competitive under the random permutation model.















Note that in these definitions, ūki is the allocated values for i in the period `k + 1 to
`k+1 using û
k, which is the actual allocation in that period. ũki is the allocation for i
in all periods if ûk is used. ūi is the actual allocation for i during the entire algorithm.
















































i are close to each other.
In particular, when k is small, the factor (1 ± ε
√
n/`k) is relatively loose while as k
increases, the factor becomes tight. The proof of Lemma 6 is similar to that of Lemma
4 and is relegated to the Appendix.
The next lemma gives a bound on the revenue obtained by the DLA.
Lemma 7. If ûki ≥
16m log (m2n/ε)
ε2

















The proof of Lemma 7 can be found in the Appendix.
Finally, we prove Proposition 4. We bound the objective value of the actual alloca-

































































































... ≤ 1 +
√
2 ≤ 2.5.
Therefore, Proposition 4 is proved. 
Similar to Lemma 5, we have the following conditions on the input parameters such
that with high probability, the conditions in Proposition 4 hold.










where b̄ = 1n mini{
∑n
j=1 bij}, η = mini,j{bij |bij > 0} and F (M,η) is such that
M ′i(ηF (M,η)C) < ηM
′
i′(C), ∀i, i′.
Then with probability 1− ε, ûki ≥ C, for all i.
The proof of Lemma 8 is given in the Appendix. Finally, we combine Proposition 4
and Lemma 8, and Theorem 15 follows.
The same remark after Lemma 5 applies here. In particular, the conditions in
Lemma 8 is only one set of sufficient conditions for our algorithm to achieve the target
performance. However, one may also use the conditions in Proposition 4 if they turn
out to hold in practice. In the next section, we show that the DLA works well even if
the conditions in Lemma 8 are not satisfied.
4.4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we report some numerical test results for our algorithms (both the
OLA and the DLA). The objective is to validate the strength of our approaches and
investigate the relationship between the performance of our algorithms and the input
parameters.
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In our numerical tests, we consider the Adwords problem. We assume there are m
advertisers (bidders), n keywords arriving sequentially, and bij is the amount bidder i
would like to pay to display his advertisement on keyword search j. We introduce a
base problem in which we set m = 50, n = 10, 000 and Mi(x) = x
p with p = 0.9. The
bidding values bij are generated in the following way:
1. Assume there are k = 100 categories of keywords. For each category k, there is
a base valuation of bidder i, denoted by b̄ik, which is generated according to the
following distribution:
b̄ik =
 0 with probability 0.7U [0.2, 1] with probability 0.3,
where U [a, b] denotes a uniformly distributed random variable on [a, b].
2. For each arriving keyword, we first randomly choose a category. The proba-
bility for each category i, denoted by ρi, is randomly chosen on the simplex
{ρi|
∑k
i=1 ρi = 1, ρi ≥ 0}. Then if category k0 is chosen, the final bid value
for bidder i will be b̄ik0 · U [0.9, 1.1].
Although the way bij is chosen seems arbitrary, we believe it reflects some major features
of the bid values in practice. In the Adwords problem, each bidder is interested in certain
categories of keywords. For example, a sport product company is interested in keywords
related to sports. The b̄iks represent such interest levels. Then the bidder i’s actual
bid on such a keyword is the base value b̄ik multiplied by a random number, which
reflects some level of idiosyncrasies of each keyword arrival. We also tested other ways
to generate bij , and the test results are similar. We will report those test results in the
end of this section.
To evaluate the performance of our algorithms, we introduce the notion of Relative
Loss (RL) defined as follows:
RL = 1− Actual Revenue
Offline Optimal Revenue
.
Note that the RL is simply 1 minus the competitive ratio used in our theoretic analysis.
102
In the numerical experiment, there is one key parameter we need to set in both of
our algorithms: ε. In Theorem 15 and Proposition 2, we gave sufficient conditions on
the inputs such that the algorithms will have expected RL less than ε. However, the
theoretical results are asymptotic and thus may not represent the best practical choice
of ε. In Table 4.1 and Figure 1, we first test both our OLA and DLA with different
choices of ε. We have the following observations from Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 (each
number in Table 4.1 is the average of 100 independent runs, the standard deviations of
the results are insignificant compared to the average value):
• For the DLA, choosing a smaller ε improves its performance. There are two reasons
for that. First, choosing a smaller ε reduces the loss due to ignoring the first εn
bids. Second, it increases the number of price updates which help the decision
maker to refine the decision policy and achieve better performance. Therefore one
should choose a smaller ε in the DLA.
• For the OLA, the optimal choice of ε is more subtle. There are two countervailing
forces when one chooses a smaller ε. On one hand, by choosing a smaller ε, the
loss due to the failure to allocate any bid during period 1 to εn becomes smaller,
which benefits the algorithm. On the other hand, if ε is too small, the learned price
may not be accurate enough which may lead to poor allocation in the remaining
periods. In the test example, the optimal choice is ε = 0.02.
• The DLA outperforms the OLA for all choices of ε.
Next we focus ourselves on the DLA. As shown in Table 4.1, we prefer to choose
a smaller ε in the DLA. In the following experiments, we will choose ε = 0.001. Next
we compare the performance of the DLA to a myopic allocation method which simply
allocates each incoming keyword to the bidder with the highest bij value. We also study
the impact of the two parameters, n and p, on the performance of our algorithm. We
generate 100 instances of the input bij and compare the average performance. The
results of the average RL are shown in Table 4.2 (the standard deviations are shown in
the parentheses) as well as in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
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ε 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10
OLA 22.02% 5.17% 4.07% 3.71% 6.10% 10.26%
DLA 0.47% 0.84% 1.27% 2.15% 4.89% 9.41%
Table 4.1: Performance of the OLA and the DLA for different choices of ε














Figure 4.1: Performance of the OLA and the DLA for different choices of ε
From Table 4.2, we can see that the DLA consistently performs better than the
myopic approach. In particular, the performance of the DLA gradually improves when
n increases, while the performance of the myopic approach seems to be insensitive to
the size n of the problem. Moreover, even for small values of n, the performance of the
DLA is still very good. This means that the DLA works well even for problems whose
size is much smaller than what Theorem 15 requires. For the parameter p, we can see
that both the DLA and the myopic algorithm deteriorate when p decreases, but the
DLA deteriorates much slower. Finally, we comment that these results are computed
when we ignore the first εn bids. In practice, one does not need to do that and the
performance of the DLA would be even better.
Finally, we repeat the above test for different setups of the inputs. We fix the
parameters m = 50, n = 10, 000, and Mi(x) = x
p with p = 0.9 in the base problem and
generate bijs in the following ways:
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n 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000
DLA 1.29% (0.29%) 0.87% (0.26%) 0.58% (0.12%) 0.57% (0.17%) 0.57% (0.16%)
Myopic 3.07% (0.47%) 3.03% (0.61%) 2.90% (0.49%) 3.11% (0.54%) 2.96% (0.47%)
p 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
DLA 2.30% (0.82%) 1.87% (0.67%) 1.55% (0.56%) 0.99 % (0.34%) 0.57% (0.17%)
Myopic 14.38% (2.01%) 12.46% (1.81%) 9.46% (1.38%) 6.51% (1.05%) 3.11% (0.54%)











Figure 4.2: Performance of the DLA (the bottom ones) and the myopic policy (the top
ones) for different problem sizes
1. bij follows a normal distribution (truncated at 0 and 1). The parameters of each
normal distribution (mean µ and standard deviation σ) are randomly generated
from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
2. bij follows a Beta distribution. The parameters (α, β) of the Beta distribution are
generated from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
3. bij follows a mixed normal and Beta distribution. That is, with probability 0.5,
bij follows a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation
0.5, and with probability 0.5, bij follows a Beta distribution with α = β = 1/2.











Figure 4.3: Performance of the DLA (the bottom ones) and the myopic policy (the top
ones) for different M(·)s
algorithm. For each case, we generate 100 instances of the input bij and compare the
average RL. The results are shown in Table 4.3.
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Case 1
n 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000
DLA 1.56% (0.33%) 0.84% (0.18%) 0.36% (0.07%) 0.21% (0.05%) 0.14% (0.03%)
Myopic 1.45% (0.45%) 1.37% (0.47%) 1.42% (0.45%) 1.41% (0.48%) 1.31% (0.47%)
p 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
DLA 0.20% (0.04%) 0.22% (0.06%) 0.22% (0.05%) 0.21% (0.03%) 0.21% (0.05%)
Myopic 9.10% (2.01%) 7.98% (2.00%) 5.71% (1.32%) 3.38% (0.96%) 1.44% (0.46%)
Case 2
n 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000
DLA 1.19% (0.24%) 0.61% (0.12%) 0.25% (0.08%) 0.13% (0.07%) 0.12% (0.08%)
Myopic 13.91% (2.07%) 13.66% (2.48%) 13.90% (2.07%) 13.78% (1.97%) 13.62% (2.12%)
p 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
DLA 0.20% (0.16%) 0.29% (0.20%) 0.21% (0.12%) 0.17% (0.11%) 0.13% (0.07%)
Myopic 40.57% (6.50%) 38.30% (5.98%) 32.45% (4.71%) 24.67% (3.26%) 13.46% (2.07%)
Case 3
n 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000
DLA 1.50% (0.31%) 0.89% (0.34%) 0.35% (0.07%) 0.21% (0.06%) 0.14% (0.01%)
Myopic 10.84% (2.50%) 11.22% (2.64%) 11.30% (2.44%) 10.91% (2.54%) 11.07% (2.85%)
p 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
DLA 0.21% (0.12%) 0.22% (0.12%) 0.15% (0.45%) 0.15% (0.35%) 0.21% (0.06%)
Myopic 37.00% (7.43%) 34.02% (6.82%) 30.22% (5.89%) 20.72% (4.70%) 10.91% (2.54%)
Table 4.3: Performance of the DLA and the myopic policy
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From Table 4.3, we can see that the DLA outperforms the myopic approach under
all the above three setups. The RL of the DLA decreases as the problem size grows,
while the RL of the myopic policy is not sensitive to n. Also, as p changes, the per-
formance of the DLA is rather stable, while the performance of the myopic algorithm
varies a lot. The overall trend of the DLA and the myopic algorithm resembles that
in the experiment in the beginning of this section. Finally, we observe that the DLA
seems robust toward various problem setups, while the myopic approach does not.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a dynamic learning algorithm for an online matching problem
with concave returns. We show that our algorithm achieves near-optimal performance
when the data arrives in a random order and satisfies some conditions. Specifically, the
order of arrival is uniformly distributed over all the permutations. Our model requires
that the number of total arrivals be known a prior and larger than a certain thresh-
old. In practice, the number of arrivals usually satisfies the threshold required here.
The analysis is primal-dual based, however, the nonlinear objective function requires
us to work around nontrivial hurdles that do not exist in previous work. Numerical
experiment results show that our algorithm works well in test problems.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we studied several problems related to pricing and risk-return anal-
ysis in an uncoordinated supply chain. In particular, we studied the optimal pricing
problem when a supplier sells to a multi-period newsvendor, and obtained the optimal
pricing strategy and comparative statics. We also established a model that considers
robust decisions in a multi-period newsvendor model under worst-case distribution. We
further derived some risk-return analysis in a supplier-retailer relationship and obtained
tight bounds of the proportion of profit of a supplier in a supply chain. In addition to the
classic newsvendor model with wholesale-price contract, two variations of the newsven-
dor model are studied, the spot market model and the revenu-sharing model. Both
models introduces variability to the supplier’s profit function. We examine the optimal
pricing and ordering policies in each model, as well as the risk-return trade-offs.
We also studied a version of the online matching problem with concave return func-
tions. We proposed two algorithms, a one-time learning algorithm and a dynamic
learning algorithm for such problems. We obtained theoretical performance bounds for
these algorithms and demonstrated via numerical experiments that these algorithms are
very efficient in practice.
There are several directions for future research:
1. To continue our work on the optimal pricing/ordering policy in the supply chain
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model, we could conduct more comparative statics on the supplier and retailer’s
optimal pricing and ordering policy. For example, we can study the effect of
market size on the supplier’s profit and the retailer’s order quantity, which was
suggested in Lariviere and Porteus (2001). In addition, we can also analyze the
supplier’s optimal pricing strategy and retailer’s ordering strategy in a model with
multiple suppliers or multiple retailers. Bringing competition to our current model
could change some basic assumptions, thus, making our model more interesting.
Another topic we could study is the effect of demand correlation across different
periods. Currently, we do not assume correlation in our demand distribution in
the distribution-free model. If we know the demand correlation, new constraints
need to be introduced to the distribution-free model. Such models would provide
some meaningful insights.
2. For the risk-return analysis, we can look at other types of supply chain contracts
that share the risk between the supplier and the retailer. One example is the
buyback contract. We can adopt a loss-aversion model similar to Zhang et al.
(2015). After looking at different supply chain contract setups, we can compare
the supply chain performance across different types of contracts, then recommend
the supplier or the retailer the best contract type to choose, similar to Pasternack
(2002).
Another possible direction is extending the risk-return analysis to a multi-period
newsvendor model. It would be interesting to characterize the relationship be-
tween the demand variation and the retailer/supplier’s profit variation.
3. For the online learning algorithms, one important direction of future work is the
practical performance of such algorithms, especially how such learning type of
algorithms compare to the algorithms that focus on the worst-case performance,
in practical size of problems. As we mentioned in the body part, such online
learning algorithms might be of very large scale. Therefore, having an algorithm
that solves optimally and efficiently for large problem size is very important.
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In our proofs, we will frequently use the following Hoeffding-Bernstein’s Inequality for
sampling without replacement:
Lemma 9 (Theorem 2.14.19 in van der Vaart and Wellner (1996):). Let u1, u2, ..., ur be















where ∆R = maxi ci −mini ci, c̄ = 1R
∑R









Proof of Lemma 2
We first write down the Lagrangian dual of (4.3). By associating pi to the first set of
constraints and yj to the second set of constraints, the Lagrangian dual of (4.3) is:
infp,y
∑n
j=1 yj + supui≥0
∑m
i=1 (Mi(ui)− piui)
s.t. yj ≥ bijpi, ∀i
yj ≥ 0, ∀j.
(B.1)
Since the primal problem is convex and only has linear constraints, Slater’s condition
holds, thus the strong duality theorem holds and (4.3) and (B.1) have the same optimal
value. Next we show that (4.4) and (B.1) are equivalent. To show this, assume the range
of M ′i(·) on [0,∞) is (ai, bi] or [ai, bi] (by the assumption that M(·)s are continuously
differentiable, it must be either one of these two forms). Now we argue that the optimal
pi must be within [ai, bi] in (B.1). First we must have pi ≥ ai, otherwise the term
supui≥0 {Mi(ui)− piui} goes to infinity as ui increases and it cannot be the optimal
solution to (B.1). On the other hand, if pi > bi, the optimal ui must be 0, and one can
always set pi = bi and achieves a smaller value of the objective function. Therefore,
pi ∈ [ai, bi] at optimality.
Now if pi ∈ (ai, bi] at optimality, one can always find one vi such that M ′i(vi) = pi,
and that vi must be the optimal solution to supui {Mi(ui)− piui} (the optimal solution
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must be attainable in this case). Therefore, each feasible solution of (B.1) will corre-
spond to a feasible solution of (4.4) and vice versa. The only case left now is when
pi = ai at optimality. In this case, supui {Mi(ui)− aiui} = limx→∞ {Mi(x)− aix}.
Also, we know that limx→∞M
′
i(x) = ai, therefore, there exists a sequence of feasible
solution of (4.4) such that the limit of the objective value equals the objective obtained
when pi = ai in (B.1). Therefore, the lemma is proved. 
Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 3
To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that for each fixed i, xi(û, bj) and x̂ij (recall
that x̂ = {x̂ij} is the optimal solution to (4.5)) differ by no more than m terms. If this
is true, then note that
∑εn
j=1 bij x̂ij = εûi and 0 ≤ bij ≤ 1, the lemma holds.
To show that xi(û, bj) and x̂ij differ by no more than m terms, we first construct






s.t. yj ≥ bijε M
′
i(vi), ∀i, j
vi ≥ 0, ∀i
yj ≥ 0, ∀j.
By Lemma 2.1, strong duality holds and thus any optimal solution should satisfy the
complementarity conditions. Among them we should have x̂ij(yj − bijε M
′
i(vi)) = 0.
Therefore, if there is no tie when we defined xi(û, bj), we must have xi(û, bj) = x̂ij . By
Assumption 1, there are no more than m ties. Thus, Lemma 3 is proved. 
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Appendix D
Proof of Lemma 6
We first prove (4.12). The idea is similar to the proof of the one-time learning case. For
any fixed ûk, we define that a random sample S (a sequence of arrival) is bad if and
only if ûk is the optimal solution to (P`k) but ū
k does not satisfy (4.12) for some i.
First, we show that the probability of a bad sample is small for any fixed ûk and fixed
i. Then we take a union bound over all distinct ûks and is to show the result.
Fix ûk and i. We define Yj = bijxi(û













































































































































Here the second inequality follows from Lemma 9, and the third inequality is due to
the condition of ûki . Similarly, we can get the bound for the second term in (D.1).
Therefore, the probability of a bad sample is bounded by 2δ.
Now we take union bound over all distinct ûk and i. Similar to the proof of Lemma
4, we call us to be distinct if they result in different allocations. As argued earlier, there
are no more than (m2n)m distinct us. Therefore, we know that with probability 1− ε,
(4.12) holds.
Next we prove (4.13). The idea is similar. Fix ûk and i. We define Yj = bijxi(û
k, bj).























































Using the same argument as above, Lemma 6 holds. 
Appendix E
Proof of Lemma 7
The proof consists of two main steps. First we show that with probability 1 − ε, the






















Since (vki , y
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i )−M ′i(ûki )ûki )












i )−Mi(ũki ) + (ũki − ûki )M ′i(ûki )).
Now for each term above, we consider two cases. If ûki ≥ ũki , then
Mi(û
k





(ûki − ũki )
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(ũki − ûki ).










































Therefore, for each i, we have




















Now we analyze Mi(ũ
k
i )−Mi( n`k ū
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Together with (E.1), Lemma 7 holds. 
Appendix F
Proof of Lemma 5 and Lemma 8
First, we note that Lemma 8 implies Lemma 5 (except for the constant part, which can
be strengthened easily by only considering one `k in the following proof). Therefore, it
suffices to prove Lemma 8.
We first prove for each k, with probability 1 − ε/ log (1/ε), mini ûki > C. Then we
take a union bound to prove Lemma 8. To show that for each k, with probability 1 −
ε/ log (1/ε), mini û
k
i > C, first we show that with probability 1−ε/ log (1/ε),
∑`k
j=1 bij ≥











∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ `k b̄/2
 ≤ 2 exp(−`k b̄2/12) < ε
m log (1/ε)
,
where the last inequality is due to condition (4.14). Next we show that given
∑`k
j=1 bij ≥
`b̄/2, there cannot exist an i such that ûki < C in the optimal solution to the partial
program (P`k). We prove by contradiction. Let K = η
εnb̄−2εC
2mC . If there exists i such
that ûki < C in the optimal solution, then we argue that there must exist 1 ≤ j ≤ `k
such that
1. j ∈ Sk = {j : xij < 1, bij > η}, and





Here these two conditions mean that there must exist a keyword j such that we allocated
it (at least partially) to bidder i′ whose total allocation had already exceeded KC when
we could have allocated it to bidder i whose final allocation is less than C.
To see this, we note that we have proved with probability 1−ε/ log (1/ε),
∑`k
j=1 bij ≥
`k b̄/2. However, by the definition of i, u
k
i < C, thus we also have
∑`k
j=1 bijxij ≤
`kC/n. Therefore, combined with the assumption that maxi,j bij ≤ 1, there must ex-
ist at least `k b̄/2 − `kC/n js between 1 and `k such that xij < 1 but bij ≥ η, i.e.,
|Sk| ≥ `k b̄/2− `kC/n.
Next we show that among j ∈ Sk, there exists at least one j such that xi′j > 0 while



















This is because Mi(·)s are increasing, thus each
∑
i xij must equal 1 at optimality. Then,










The last inequality is by the definition of K and that `k ≥ εn for all k. Therefore, there
exists j ∈ Sk such that the bid is allocated to some i′ with ûki′ ≥ KC. We denote such
j by j∗.
Finally, we consider another allocation that increases the allocation of j∗ to i while




i )bij −M ′i′(ûki′)bi′j ≥M ′i(C)η −M ′i′(KC) > 0
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where the first inequality is due to the concavity of Mi(·)s and the last inequality is
due to condition (4.14). However, this contradicts the assumption that the solution is
optimal. Thus, Lemma 8 is proved. 
Appendix G
Risk-Return Curve of the
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t− 12(µ− t) (−α+ β + ξ)
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2 + α− β − ξ
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µ (αξ − 1)− t (−2 + α+ αξ)
)
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